



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

1975-03

An analysis of OD technology in the U.S. Navy: a case study

Colavito, Thomas J.

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/20737>

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun



<http://www.nps.edu/library>

Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

AN ANALYSIS OF OD TECHNOLOGY IN THE
U. S. NAVY: A CASE STUDY

Thomas J. Colavito

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY.
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

AN ANALYSIS OF OD TECHNOLOGY IN THE
U. S. NAVY: A CASE STUDY

by

Thomas J. Colavito

March 1975

Thesis Advisor:

R. A. McGonigal

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

T167541

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) An Analysis of OD Technology in the U. S. Navy: A Case Study		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis: March 1975
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Thomas J. Colavito		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE March 1975
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 167
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) ** Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Organization development		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The U. S. Navy has recently institutionalized procedures for conducting organization development interventions within the operating forces. This effort is being executed by Human Resource Management Centers and Detachments (HRMC/D). The technology employed by the HRMC/D is explored in a case study of an intervention into a surface combatant. The case is analyzed and compared with conventional literature in the field. The comparison reveals that a greater emphasis is required by the Navy in		

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

achieving the necessary collaborative relationship between the client and the consultant. Recommendations for improving this deficiency and other aspects of the technology are proposed.

An Analysis of OD Technology in the U. S.
Navy: A Case Study

by

Thomas J. Colavito
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B. A., Franklin and Marshall College, 1962

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 1975

Thurs
C. 5-2-54
2.

ABSTRACT

The U. S. Navy has recently institutionalized procedures for conducting organization development interventions within the operating forces. This effort is being executed by Human Resource Management Centers and Detachments (HRMC/D). The technology employed by the HRMC/D is explored in a case study of an intervention into a surface combatant. The case is analyzed and compared with conventional literature in the field. The comparison reveals that a greater emphasis is required by the Navy in achieving the necessary collaborative relationship between the client and the consultant. Recommendations for improving this deficiency and other aspects of the technology are proposed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION-----	8
	A. BACKGROUND-----	8
	B. OBJECTIVE AND ORGANIZATION OF THESIS-----	9
	C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY-----	10
II.	SURVEY OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE---	11
	A. INTRODUCTION-----	11
	B. BACKGROUND-----	11
	1. OD in Historical Perspective-----	11
	2. Need for OD-----	14
	3. Origins of OD-----	15
	4. OD's Model of an Organization-----	18
	5. Definition and Objectives of OD-----	18
	6. More of an Art than a Science-----	19
	7. The Change Agent-----	20
	C. TECHNOLOGY-----	21
	1. Entry-----	22
	a. Relationship-----	22
	b. Preconditions-----	24
	c. Contract-----	26
	d. Point of Entry-----	28
	e. Summary-----	28
	2. Data Collection-----	29
	3. Diagnosis-----	30

	4. Data Feedback-----	31
	5. Action-----	33
	D. SUMMARY-----	36
III.	THE NAVY'S ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM-----	37
	A. INTRODUCTION-----	37
	B. HISTORY-----	38
	C. TECHNOLOGY-----	39
	1. Overview-----	39
	2. Entry-----	41
	3. Data Collection-----	41
	4. Diagnosis-----	43
	5. Data Feedback-----	47
	6. Action-----	49
IV.	CASE STUDY: USS THUNDERBOLT-----	51
	A. INTRODUCTION-----	51
	B. BACKGROUND-----	52
	C. ENTRY-----	53
	D. DATA COLLECTION-----	54
	E. DIAGNOSIS-----	55
	F. DATA FEEDBACK-----	56
	G. ACTION-----	60
V.	CASE STUDY DISCUSSION-----	66
	A. ENTRY-----	66
	B. DATA COLLECTION-----	71
	C. DIAGNOSIS AND DATA FEEDBACK-----	71
	D. ACTION-----	72



VI.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS-----	73
APPENDIX A	CHRONOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM-----	84
APPENDIX B	CASE EXHIBITS-----	86
APPENDIX C	DIAGRAM OF SURVEY-GUIDED DEVELOPMENT-----	162
BIBLIOGRAPHY-----		163
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST-----		166

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The 1972 report by the House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on disciplinary problems in the U. S. Navy recommended that " . . . naval leadership, the chain of command, and harmonious interpersonal relations must be strengthened." [Ref. 32, p. 17672] Subsequent to, but not necessarily as a result of, the subcommittee's report, the CNO promulgated the Navy Human Goals Plan which is " . . . designed to ensure the development of the full potential of the Navy's human resources and the application of that potential toward maximum effectiveness in the performance of the Navy's primary mission." [Ref. 14, p. 1] As proposed, the Human Goals Plan consists of five major programs, one of which is the Human Resources Management Program. The objective of the Human Resources Management Program at the unit command level is " . . . to create a new initiative to and (sic) cope with contemporary problems in a changing environment by utilizing current theories and academic findings within the traditional Navy structure. It focuses on the development of leadership skills in the functions of planning, decision making, communications, awareness, problem identification and solution, and conflict management." [Ref. 14, p. B-2] The Human Resources Management Program is designed to be implemented within the operating forces of the Navy through Human Resources Management Centers and Detachments (HRMC/D).

The Human Resources Management Program is sub-divided into four major areas: one of which is Organizational Development and Management. This portion of the Human Resources Management Program " . . . provides commands with assistance of trained specialists in organizational development to assist a command in increasing the overall performance of its personnel towards mission attainment and overall command excellence." [Ref. 14, p. B-3] Thus the U. S. Navy has become a practitioner of organization development.

B. OBJECTIVE AND ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

The purpose of this thesis is not to evaluate the merits of using organization development in the Navy. Its objective is to evaluate the technology presently employed by comparing an actual case with the literature in the field. Based on this comparison recommendations for improving the technology are proposed. Its secondary purpose is to provide an actual case study for possible classroom use at the Naval Postgraduate School.

There are many different strategies and models which collectively may be called organization development (OD). However, common to most OD strategies is a sequence of events or phases. These phases constitute the technology of OD and can be classified as: 1) Entry, 2) Data Collection, 3) Diagnosis, 4) Data Feedback, 5) Action, 6) Evaluation and 7) Withdrawal. All but the last two phases will be discussed. Section II will discuss the history and technology of OD in conventional literature. Section III

will address the history and technology of OD in the U. S. Navy. Section IV is a case study of an OD effort conducted by HRMC/D aboard a U. S. Navy ship. Section V analyzes the specific case utilizing the information provided in the preceding sections. Section VI draws upon the case analysis to make some general conclusions regarding OD technology in the U. S. Navy.

It has been the author's experience that very few members of the Naval Postgraduate School faculty are sufficiently familiar with the Navy's OD effort. Therefore, the case study has been designed so that it could be utilized as a classroom device thereby providing the student with an account of an actual OD intervention in the naval environment. The survey printout has been provided for two reasons. First, to familiarize the student with the form of the survey results. Secondly, for the ambitious who may desire to further diagnose the problems of this specific ship.

C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To collect the data for the case study, the author was a "participant as observer" in the sense that Phillips uses the term. [Ref. 26, p. 168] The author revealed his role as a student doing research. The author did not, however, actively take part in the OD effort. The author did utilize unstructured interviews with members of both the client organization and the consultant team. The author was present for the HRAV planning session on 21 June and throughout the five day HRAV. The case was

developed from these observations, interviews, and the consultant's notes concerning the intervention.

II. SURVEY OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a synopsis of the important literature relevant to the U. S. Navy's organization development (OD) effort. It is against this backdrop of expert knowledge that the case in section IV will be analyzed. The chapter contains two main sections. The first discusses the origin, definition and objectives of organization development and provides additional background information about the field. The second section contains a more detailed discussion of the technology employed in OD.

B. BACKGROUND

1. OD in Historical Perspective

To place organization development in its historical perspective it is useful to briefly review the development of organization theory. Throughout the ages there has been a considerable amount of effort concentrated on identifying the factors which contribute to an effective organization. The emphasis of the early works was primarily on the organization of the society and the state. Plato's REPUBLIC serves as a good example of this type of work. However, at the turn of the 19th century this effort began to center on smaller organizational entities. This

shift of emphasis is not too difficult to comprehend since the world was experiencing the effects of the industrial revolution which resulted in a tremendous growth in the number of small economic organizations. It was at this time that businessmen, administrators, scholars, and agency heads began to think about organizations in a systematic and scientific manner.

From the beginning of the 20th century to the outbreak of the Second World War there emerged an assortment of studies and writings which collectively are known in most management textbooks as the classical or traditional school of management. These writers were seeking answers to fundamental questions about the management of work and the management of organizations. For the most part, they were practitioners and engineers by vocation. Their implicit assumption about man was that he was driven by his desire for economic betterment. These writings could also be characterized by the lack of imperical data to substantiate their propositions. The giants of this era were men like Taylor (1911), Fayol (1925), Mooney (1925), Urwick (1937), and Gilbreth (1911). In their studies, these men were looking for the principles which could be applied for the "one best way" to run an effective and efficient organization.

Most of the writers of the classical school did not consider the human aspects of the organization. Two notable exceptions however were Follet (1940) and Benard (1938) who could be considered forerunners of the next major classification of writings: the human relations school. This school came to the

forefront principally as a result of the world-wide publicity of Roethlisberger's and Dickson's studies (1939) of the Hawthorne division of the General Electric Company. The chief contributors of this school were: Mayo (1944), Lewin (1947), McGregor (1947), and Lippitt (1958). Their writings prevailed in the management literature during the forties and through the fifties. In contrast to the proponents of the classical school, most of the writers in the human relations school were educators. Again, this school was looking for the "one best way" to structure and operate an effective organization. The thrust of their message was participative management.

In the early to mid-sixties two major movements emerged and dominated most of the management literature of that decade. Both movements treated organizations as systems. During this period, writers concerned with the theory of organizations began to view the organization as a system of mutually interdependent parts linked together for a common purpose. They viewed the organization much the way the biologists and people in the field of electrical engineering viewed the objects of their studies. William Scott labels this concept of organization as the modern theory and states that it is characterized by attempting to fully integrate the disciplines of the social and physical sciences. [Ref. 28]

The second movement in the decade of the sixties has come to be known as Organization Development (OD). Mark A. Frohman and S. Sashkin imply that the works of the classical and human

relations theorists concentrated on a concern for stability and certainty. They additionally and rightfully cite the work of Max Weber (1947) as characteristic of this concern. In writing about organization development, they contrast this concern by stating " . . . this new field (organization development) represents a concern for change, innovation, challenge and development in organization functioning." [Ref. 19, p. 2] They continue by stating:

This shift of emphasis from stability to change and innovation, is not really surprising. It is simply a reflection of the incredible rate of change that society as a whole has experienced over the past hundred years, and of the continuous increase in this rate. As a result, while for over seventy years the focus was on establishing stable internal structure and functioning of organizations, this focus is now one way of keeping pace with changes in the society outside the organization and facilitating changes in patterns of organizational structure and functioning.

Thus, societal change produces pressures for organizational change, and has created a boom in the field of O. D.

[Ref. 19, p. 2]

2. Need for OD

Most of the literature which discusses the origins of organization development is adamant about the fact that the "times of the day," that is the rapid changes in values, technology and society in general, have created a situation in which our traditional bureaucratic organizations are ill equipped to cope with. The following statement by Bennis not only substantiates what Frohman and Sashkin expressed but also gives the flavor of the enthusiasm generally expressed by the writers in the field:

Neither behavioral scientists nor their theories created the need for organization development. They helped, of course, but there should be no doubt that Alfred P. Sloan put his finger on the real cause: CHANGE. Our social institutions cannot withstand, let alone cope with, the devastating rate of change without fundamental alterations in the way they negotiate their environments and the way they conduct the main operations of their enterprise. Organization development is not something that is 'nice' to have around, like a shiny new gadget, or because its value system resembles our Judaic Christian ethic. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT IS NECESSARY WHENEVER OUR SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS COMPETE FOR SURVIVAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF CHRONIC CHANGE.

[Ref. 7, p. 18]

3. Origins of OD

Organization development can trace its origins to the time frame of the human relations era. During that period, there were two categories of research activity which later formed the building blocks for organization development. Sensitivity-training or laboratory-training as it is sometimes called was one of the areas. The other area was known as survey research and feedback, now commonly referred to as survey-feedback. This observation is substantiated by French and Bell in their discussion of the history of organization development:

We see systematic organization development activities as having a recent history, and to use an analogy with a tree, as having at least two important trunk stems. One stem consists of innovations in the application of laboratory-training insights to organizations. A second major stem is survey research and feedback methodology.

[Ref. 15, p. 21]

Because of the historical importance of these two areas, it is helpful to take a closer but at the same time cursory glance into the origins and definitions of survey-feedback and sensitivity training. Survey-feedback, as it is known today, had its

beginnings at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. It was pioneered at the institute by Floyd C. Mann, H. Baumgartel and Rensis Likert during the mid-fifties. Subsequently, F. W. Neff, and D. G. Bowers have done a considerable amount of writing in the area. Miles et al gives a good concise explanation of survey-feedback:

Survey feedback is a process in which outside staff and members of the organization collaboratively gather, analyze and interpret data that deal with various aspects of the organization's functioning and its members' work lives, and using the data as a base, begin to correctively alter the organizational structure and the members' work relationship.

[Ref. 24, p. 458]

In its purest form, the data are fed back to the organization in an "interlocking chain of conferences." [Ref. 23, p. 609] In this process a member receives the feedback from his superior and then he in turn feeds it down the line to his subordinates. Baumgartel adds an additional insight to the process which is worthy of note. He states that " . . . it deals with each manager, supervisor, and employee in the context of his own job, his own problems and his own work relationships." [Ref. 4, p. 5]

In contrast, sensitivity training concentrates on individual self-awareness and personal growth in unstructured small-group situations. French and Bell have traced the origins of sensitivity training to a workshop held in the summer of 1946. "This workshop was sponsored by the Connecticut Interracial Commission and the Research Center for Group Dynamics, then at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology." [Ref. 15, p. 21]

Bennis sheds further insight into the process by stating:

"Laboratory-training, . . . takes man's emotional life as its central issue and seeks to determine how these emotions affect his relationships with others and his capacity for attaining high competence. It focuses on life experiences that ordinarily are bypassed or ignored; man's affective regions." [Ref. 7, p. 62]

Key figures in the development of sensitivity training were: Benne, Bennis, Lewin, Lippitt, McGregor, Sheppard, and Blake. In the late fifties Sheppard and McGregor were instrumental in applying the process to complex organizations for the purpose of increasing their effectiveness. Also of particular note was Kurt Lewin's theory of adult learning. The underlying philosophy of this theory is that learning takes place only after a person has been "unfrozen," that is, the individual feels safe to let go of some previously learned patterns and behaviors and thereby becomes willing to examine alternative ideas, approaches, and behaviors. (Lewin's theory is: unfreeze - learn new - refreeze.)

Sensitivity training was also the principle source of what is now known as process consultation which is an important ingredient in organization development. " . . . most of the assumptions which P-C (process consultation) makes in relation to working with an organization are derived of assumptions which "trainers" make in working with laboratory-training groups." [Ref. 27, p. 12] In Schein's words Process Consultation " . . . is a set of activities on the part of the consultant which help

the client to perceive, understand, and act upon process events which occur in the client's environment." [Ref. 27, p. 9]

4. OD's Model of an Organization

The assumptions, theories and findings resulting from the pioneering work in both survey-feedback and sensitivity training formed the basis of organization development. However, the writings of Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) on organization theory have also had an important impact on the formation of organization development. They viewed organizations as systems in the same way as Scott's modern organizational theorists propose. More specifically, they viewed the organization as one which consisted of individuals possessing predispositions based on their own past personal experiences. In order for the organization to cope with the environment, the individual is given a specialized task (differentiation) which in turn creates the need for coordination (integration). "At the most general level, it is a systems approach to the study of organizations. Within this general framework is the notion of an organization as a system of differentiated units which require integration, and the view of the individual contributor as a complex problem-solving system himself." [Ref. 21, p. 8]

5. Definition and Objectives of OD

Having briefly discussed the origins of organization development, it is convenient at this point to propose a definition. It must be pointed out that because of its youth there is no one universal definition. French and Bell offer a very comprehensive

one, [Ref. 15, p. 15], however, this author prefers that proposed by Mark A. Frohman:

Operationally, organization development is a planned effort to improve the functioning and effectiveness of an entire system through applications of behavioral science knowledge to the processes and structures of the system.

[Ref. 19, p. 3]

Several authors have expressed the objectives of organization development. A small sampling of those expressions will convey the main thrust: "to create a self-renewing organization," [Ref. 11, p. xi], "to change the organization from its current state to a better developed state," [Ref. 21, p. 4], "to increase organization health and effectiveness." [Ref. 5, p. 25] Blake and Mouton provide an added dimension by emphasizing that the culture, climate and personality of the organization plays a major role in its effectiveness. "No matter how competent a man may be, the culture of his situation is a significant factor in determining whether or not he is able to apply his competence." [Ref. 8, p. 112]

6. More of an Art than a Science

Although based on the scientific methods employed in behavioral research methodology, the practice of organization development is more of an art than a science. "Despite the common occurrence of organizational change, its dynamics and underlying processes are understood in only rough, ill-defined ways." [Ref. 3, p. 79] Frohman and Sashkin conclude that "much more research and knowledge is required before organization development becomes less of an art and more of a science."

[Ref. 19, p. 54] Therefore, it should not be concluded from the fact that organization development has been successful on many occasions that the reasons for success are known or, more importantly, understood. However, Greiner has identified the following general factors which he has found to be common to most successful efforts:

There is pressure on the top management which induces some arousal to action.

There is some form of intervention at the top, either a new member of the organization, or a consultant, or a new staff head in organization-development. This induces some reorientation in looking at internal problems.

There is a diagnosis of the problem areas and this induces an analysis of specific problems.

There is an invention of some new solutions to problems and this produces some commitment to new courses of action.

There is some experimentation with new solutions and this produces a search for results with the experiments.

There is reinforcement in the system from positive results and this produces acceptance of the new practices.

[Ref. 16, p. 126-129]

7. The Change Agent

A distinguishing characteristic of organization development is its use of a "change agent." The change agent is usually external to the organization and has been trained in the broad area of social psychology but more specifically in organizational psychology. He has attained the skill to apply organizational development strategies and models to an on-going organization. " . . . the primary responsibility of this role is to facilitate the improvement of organization effectiveness and health through

providing interventions, development activities, and programs for organization improvement." [Ref. 5, p. 20]

C. OD TECHNOLOGY

The technology of organization development consists of many models and strategies. A partial list would include: Managerial Grid, Team Building, Techno-structural, Survey-feedback, Sensitivity Training, and Conflict Management. French and Bell give a comprehensive overview of these and others and provides useful classification schemes for the strategies. [Ref. 15, p. 97-146] In contrast, entire books have been dedicated solely to one strategy. It is not within the scope of this introductory section to deal with any particular strategy in depth. However, there are distinct phases which most strategies have in common.

Most of the organization development programs named above will consist of the following steps or phases:

ENTRY into the organization by a consultant (change agent)

Collection of organizational data (DATA COLLECTION)

DIAGNOSIS of data

Feeding back of data (DATA FEEDBACK)

A therapeutic or ACTION phase

An EVALUATION of the effort

WITHDRAWAL of the consultant from the organization.

The discussion that follows and the case analysis will address all but the last two of these phases.

1. Entry

a. Relationship

Conventionally, consultants have been utilized by organizations to 1) purchase information about its internal organization or its environment, 2) purchase a service, 3) assess their present state and to prescribe solutions to problems which might surface. Schein categorizes the first two uses as the "Purchase Model" and the third as the "Doctor-Patient Model." [Ref. 27, p. 5-6] However, in organization development the role of the consultant does not fall into either of these models. In line with the earlier stated objectives of organization development and as the name "change agent" implies, the organization development consultant seeks to bring about change. Based on Lewin's (1951) force-field theory, it is now generally acknowledged that human beings will resist change. Lawrence comments that it can be concluded from the study by Coch and French that resistance to change can be overcome by getting the people that are subject to the change to participate in making it. But Lawrence cautions that participation is not something that can be conjured up or created artificially. "Participation, to be of value, must be based on a search for ideas that are seen as truly relevant to the change under consideration." [Ref. 20, p. 6]

Accordingly, a key element in any organization development program is that the client and consultant achieve a relationship that will promote the client's full and earnest participation in the change effort. The building of this critical

relationship commences with the initial contact which begins the entry phase. So critical is this relationship to the success of the effort that, " . . . the problems that inhere in that relationship are probably symptomatic of the problems to be encountered." [Ref. 7, p. 46] This becomes a pivotal statement for understanding the case in section IV.

In addition to the relationship promoting participation it should also be characterized by an open and honest exchange of information with respect to perceptions and expectations by both the client and consultant. This requirement is important because as the program unfolds the client may be confronted with issues dealing in these areas. In particular, problems might be identified which could be explained, caused or effected by individual or group perceptions and expectations. Therefore, both the client and consultant must be ready to deal with these issues in an open and confronting manner.

The relationship should also be open and honest from the standpoint that each should understand the motivation of the other. It should not be characterized by subtleties and hidden agenda items. On the contrary all desires, expectations, and thoughts should be made explicit. In this way, a climate which promotes effective problem solving can be obtained and will be required to be sustained throughout the effort.

Mutual trust and confidence should also be a characteristic of the client-consultant relationship. Trust from the standpoint that the members of the organization should not see

the consultant as a spy carrying out a pet project of the boss or that they are being manipulated. Also from the standpoint that the client can trust the ethics of the consultant. The client must also be confident that the consultant is competent in his field.

In order to fulfill the above characteristics, the relationship should not be one of subordinate-superior or teacher pupil, but rather one which is collaborative (power-equal). Webster's Dictionary defines collaborate as "to work together; especially in reference to literary, artistic or scientific work." Throughout the literature, collaborative is the word which is most used to describe the client-consultant relationship in organization development.

b. Preconditions

In order to fully participate, the client, be it the individual or the organization, must be "ready." If the client has the notion that organization development carries with it some mystique, this should be dispelled. He should have no fears about what organization development is, what its objectives are and generally by what means these objectives are attained. If the client is knowledgeable about organization development, he is more prone to be "ready." If on the other hand he lacks knowledge in the area he is very likely to react defensively thus preventing him from fully participating. C. Brooklyn Derr experienced this latter reaction in his work in a large city school system. As a result of his experience in

that setting, he describes an entry strategy for school systems which includes a two-day entry workshop, " . . . a brief organization development kind of experience, such as the entry workshop, may be needed to help the client organization to really understand the OD method so that they can use it successfully for organizational change." [Ref. 12, p. 51]

Another aspect of readiness is expressed by Bennis when he discusses the cultural state of the client. He points out that "each client system transmits and maintains a system of values that permeates the organization and is used as a basis for action and commitment." [Ref. 7, p. 45] He concludes that if these values are too much at odds with the values of the OD consultant, then the OD effort should be avoided. In his discussion, he elaborates on some cultural variables which are important. Of particular note, and of relevance to the practice of OD in the Navy, is his statement regarding the control and authority system employed by the client. "If it is too rigid and authoritarian, it may be too much at variance with the values of organization development." [Ref. 7, p. 45] Assessing the cultural readiness of the client system is a subjective process. However, "one of the best ways of diagnosing the cultural readiness has to do with the way the client system reacts to and establishes a relationship with the change agent." [Ref. 7, p. 47]

A further aspect of organizational readiness addresses the clients felt need for change. "Unless the client is experiencing some 'pain' which drives him to seek the appropriate

help, then the consultant cannot be of much assistance." [Ref. 13, p. 15] Most authors argue that there must be a strong pressure for improvement from both inside and outside the organization. According to Greiner, this is one of the distinguishing characteristics of successful change efforts. [Ref. 16, 126] On the other hand, French and Bell have expressed the view that the important element that should be present is a sense that things could be better. Accordingly, they propose that OD can play an important "tune-up" role for an organization. [Ref. 15, p. 148] The literature reviewed conveys the thought that the client seeks help from the consultant. It is not the consultant who initiates the first action. This implies that the client, for some reason, feels that he has a problem that the consultant can help him with. Whether he is feeling pain or just feels that things could be better is a matter of degree. The important point is that the client feels a need and seeks help. The basic underlying assumption of the above statements is the theory that motivation to change is created by a realization that the present state differs from the desired state.

c. Contract

An objective of the entry phase is the establishment of a mutually agreeable contract. "In O. D. consulting, the contract is central to success or failure." [Ref. 31, p. 1] In discussing what he means by contract, Weisbord states: "I mean an explicit exchange of expectations, part dialogue, part written document, which clarifies for consultant and client three critical areas:

What each expects to get from the relationship;

How much time each will invest, when, and at what cost;

The ground rules under which the parties will operate.
[Ref. 31, p. 1]

Most authors refer to the contract as containing two main aspects. The first has to do with the commitment, motivation and collaboration of the client. This aspect is referred to as the psychological contract. The second aspect of the contract is called the content portion. This aspect deals mainly with the ground rules such as when, where, and how meetings will be conducted.

Weisbord is quick to point out that contracting is a continuous and iterative process. Although it commences during the entry phase it continues throughout the entire OD program. "Contracting like the seasons, is repetitive and continually renewable." [Ref. 31, p. 2]

From a practitioners point of view the following list of questions might be considered as the contract solidifies:

What are your various roles in this relationship?

How and when will you collaborate?

Who is your contact person with the system?

How should you be introduced?

How, when and where will you collect data?

How will you work together (behavioral norms)?

What are your/the client's ethics for this work?*

*Class notes of C. Brooklyn Derr.

d. Point of Entry

Argyris believes that change can only take place if it starts at the top and then percolates down. [Ref. 2, p. 278] Beer and Muse have found that "change can and does begin at lower levels in the organization." [Ref. 6, p. 99] However they say that "what is necessary is that someone in a strategic position feel the need for change and improvement." [Ref. 6, p. 82] Bennis states that "organization development programs can begin anywhere so long as there is some kind of 'umbrella' protection from the next highest echelon and so long as the other systems that relate to the client are aware of, if not committed to, the goals of the organization development program." [Ref. 7, p. 57] In summary, although there is not consensus within the literature, it is probably safe to conclude that for an OD effort to be successful it "does not necessarily need to start at the top, although this is the ideal circumstance." [Ref. 15, p. 148]

e. Summary

From the above discussion it can be concluded that "entry is of primary importance to the whole OD process." [Ref. 13, p. 14] It is during this phase that the preconditions, which have been found to be necessary, are assessed. This assessment can only be made subjectively and perhaps only sensed through the relationship between the client and consultant. The client and consultant should build an open, honest, trusting and collaborative relationship. This relationship is critical

to the success of the OD effort. This relationship is necessary so that the client can fully participate in the change effort. To express it in a different manner, "the system involved in change must be the source, target and agent of change." [Ref. 19, p. 54] The entry phase culminates in a contract which is mutually agreeable to both parties. The relationship-building and contracting is a continuous and iterative process that continues throughout the entire OD effort. Although there is not consensus on the point, it is generally considered ideal if entry could take place at the top of the organization.

2. Data Collection

The methods of data collection for OD are the same as for the social sciences in general. However, a difference does exist in the manner in which the client or subject is involved with the collection and uses of the data. Argyris labels the traditional social research methodology as "mechanistic" and the method used in organization development as "organic." [Ref. 1, p. 104]

Traditional or mechanistic social research has relied on a researcher-subject relationship. In such a relationship the researcher is viewed by the subject as an expert and often a boss-subordinate relationship results. Traditional research stresses the non-involvement of the subject with the researcher for fear that the subject will contaminate the data. The fact that the findings of social research can be proven to be statistically valid does not necessarily mean that this type of

relationship; itself, has not invalidated the findings. In fact, most books and courses on traditional social research warn the novice researcher of the social desirability or demand effect which can influence a subject's response. This view of the subject also effects the manner in which the findings are fed back. In this process the researcher usually assumes the role of an expert and does not actively involve the subject.

In contrast, OD follows a research model which is referred to as action-research. It is characterized by the full involvement of the subject in both the collection and feeding back of the data. The subject is viewed as the user of this information and as such will ultimately be responsible for how it effects his system. This model also involves both researcher and client in what is called the action phase. This phase implements the findings of the research. To carry the model to its completion requires both parties to evaluate the effects of the implementation by again collecting data. Therefore it is an iterative process which occurs until withdrawal of the consultant. French and Bell provide an interesting diagram which graphically displays this process. [Ref. 15, p. 86]

3. Diagnosis

The objective of the data collection phase was to collect data about the present state of the organization. The objective of the diagnosis phase is to interpret this data in order to find out what the present state is. Based on the diagnosis, the direction of the change effort can then be determined. Bowers

and Franklin state that "a successful change effort begins with rigorous measurement of the way in which the organization presently is functioning. These measurements provide the material for a diagnosis, and the diagnosis forms the basis for the design of a program of change activities." [Ref. 10, p. 45] They continue by stating the reasons for the importance of the diagnostic step: "It will increase the probability of focusing upon the right, not the wrong, course of treatments being prescribed." [Ref. 10, p. 46] The diagnosis of the present state of an organization is also useful as a reference for evaluating the results of the change effort.

The diagnosis usually focuses on two aspects of the organization; the structure and the processes. The structural approach stresses the diagnosis of subsystems within the organization in an attempt to identify problems at certain levels within the system. The process approach emphasizes the organizational processes which permeate all levels. The OD consultant will need to integrate the two approaches in order to accomplish an accurate and meaningful diagnosis. "From a diagnosis of these systems and processes, . . . a strategy for change emerges." [Ref. 5, p. 27]

4. Data Feedback

Lawrence and Lorsch contend that the manner in which the data are presented and interpreted to the members of the organization is generally accomplished in one of two ways.

First, the raw data are discussed with top management, who are asked to make the diagnosis within their own framework; or second, the change agent may present his own diagnosis without making his model for analyzing organizational behavior explicit. The problem with the first approach is that management is limited by its own framework and it tends to see each problem separately, failing at times to recognize the interrelationship between problems and what may lie behind them. The second approach has inherent in it the problems of communication in getting management to see why the change agent sees the problems the way he does.

[Ref. 22, p. 470]

Therefore, the objective of the data feedback phase is not merely to present the diagnosis to the client nor is it to have the client diagnose the data himself. The key issue in this phase is for the client to fully participate and to be genuinely involved with the data and its meanings. For this to occur, there must exist a relationship between the client and consultant that will foster a mutual and collaborative effort. The importance of this relationship was discussed in the section on entry. This relationship should result in an open and confronting climate which will allow the client to question, test and attack the data to the point where he develops a firm belief in its worthiness. In essence, the feedback phase should result in a joint diagnosis which the client perceives as meaningful and relevant; one which he is able to accept and internalize. Accomplishing this allows the client and consultant to plan a course of action to correct the perceived discrepancies.

The fact that change can be initiated by feedback itself is concisely stated by French and Bell in their discussion of feedback as an intervention or strategy:

Feedback: This refers to learning new data about oneself, others, group processes, or organizational dynamics - data that one did not previously take active account of. Feedback refers to activities and processes that 'reflect' or 'mirror' an objective picture of the real world. Awareness of the 'new information' may lead to change if the feedback is not too threatening.

[Ref. 15, p. 108]

Therefore, not only is feedback a necessary prerequisite for the action phase, it, in and of itself, could be considered as part of the action step. This is an important ingredient in the Navy's OD program.

1.5. Action

The content of the action phase is dependent upon the diagnosis of the system's present state in relation to its desired state. "The action which is taken cannot be separated from the diagnosis made." [Ref. 22, p. 470] To describe in detail the full range of activities that could comprise this phase is beyond the scope of this thesis. The reader is referred to French and Bell (pp. 97-146) for a concise overview of the most widely used techniques. The Navy's OD interventions and related action phase is based primarily on the survey feedback method. It is to this area that the action phase discussion will be confined.

An authoritative volume on survey feedback does not presently exist, however there are a number of articles written about the method. In one such article, Floyd C. Mann describes his pioneering study in the area. In this study, it was found that more significant positive changes occurred in employee attitudes and perceptions in four experimental groups using

survey feedback than in the two control groups which did not feed back the survey results. [Ref. 23, p. 611] David G. Bowers, of the Institute for Social Research, outlines the comprehensive study, known as the Michigan ICL study, which utilized 17,000 respondents in 23 organizations. This study indicates that when compared with four different strategies, survey feedback was associated with the most significant frequency of improvement. The study compared the following strategies: survey feedback, interpersonal process consultation, task process consultation, and laboratory training. [Ref. 9, p. 21]

In another article, Bowers and Franklin describe the two main underlying assumptions associated with this method. First, the difference between perceptions is motivation. Secondly, behavior is goal-seeking or goal-oriented and feedback is necessary in order to discern the distance from the goal. [Ref. 10, p. 49]

In yet another article by Bowers, the rationale of the survey portion of the method is described.

Survey feedback starts from a point of the presentation of tabulated data obtained from responses to a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. The nature of the items in the questionnaire leads to those responses representing a summarization, in each respondent's mind, of behavior or conditions as they have existed 'on the average' over some previous period of time.* Because it combines many responses, from each of many individuals, the information is rather highly reliable. Because most of these individuals have experienced the behavior or condition first hand for a long period of time, they know it well, and their responses are presumably reasonably valid. The use of a standard questionnaire instrument, developed with technical care, enhances these two conditions. It also results, however, in the omission from consideration

of events and characteristics which are either rare, or unique to the group, individual, or organization in question.

*Informal investigations conducted in the early years of ICLS indicate that most respondents take six months to a year into account in arriving at their response.

[Ref. 18, p. 12]

The feedback portion is uniquely summarized by Miles, Horstein, et al:


Often, though not always, the data are shown first to the 'head' of the family group, at which point his presentation of the data to the rest of the group may be discussed or rehearsed. Then the data are presented to the rest of the group, who are, in fact, 'heads' of other family groups. Subsequently, they will examine the data with their groups. Thus, the survey feedback takes place through an interlocking set of conferences. Typically, outside staff members are present at each of the conferences.

Ordinarily, examination of the data leads to action planning in response to problems made salient by the data. Consequently, these feedback conferences provide clients the opportunity to engage in problem-solving activities in the presence of outside staff members, who attempt to use their training skill to help members of the groups improve their relationship.

[Ref. 24, p. 459]

Bowers suggests that the diagnosis might indicate the need for a number of different therapeutic techniques besides problem-solving activities. He indicates that the consultant therefore must be sufficiently skilled and flexible enough to conduct those activities that might be suggested by the diagnosis. [Ref. 10, p. 52] French and Bell add that "this kind of attitude survey, coupled with a series of workshops involving work teams at successively lower levels of the organization, can be used to create action plans and change across a wide range of variables in a social, structural, goal, and task subsystems of an organization." [Ref. 15, p. 132]

The accompanying diagram, taken from French and Bell, places survey feedback in perspective with other OD methodologies with respect to the depth of intervention. [Ref. 15, p. 176]



D. SUMMARY

The chronic social and technological change prevalent in today's society has created a need for OD. Sensitivity training and survey feedback formed the building blocks of OD. Although there are many OD strategies, each of them usually consist of the following phases: 1) entry, 2) data collection, 3) diagnosis, 4) data feedback, 5) action, 6) evaluation, and 7) withdrawal. All but the last two phases were discussed. Although each phase



is sufficiently distinct, and normally follows in sequence, there is no clear dividing line between each. In some instances, phases may overlap to a substantial degree. Each phase is crucial to the effort, however, the entry phase is considered to be of primary importance. The relationship between the client and consultant begins during this phase and can be seen to have a considerable influence on the remaining phases.

The information contained in this section will be used to analyze a case study of an OD effort conducted in a ship of the U. S. Navy. Before doing so, it may be helpful to describe OD as institutionalized by the U. S. Navy. This will be the subject of the next section.

III. THE NAVY'S ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this section is to describe the history and technology of the Navy's OD effort thereby providing a bridge between the OD literature and actual practice: the case study. The information was drawn from a handbook for Navy consultants, The Human Goals Plan and observation of the system in operation.

The Navy has been indirectly involved in organization development since the mid-1940's. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has funded important work in the area of sensitivity training and survey-feedback. In 1947, ONR financed the historic three-week summer session at Bethel, Maine. The work of that summer formed the basis for the National Training Laboratory. The

Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan has also done some pioneering work in survey-feedback under the sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research.

While the Office of Naval Research is still very active in funding studies in the area, the operating Navy has become a practitioner of organization development. The Navy's practical organization development effort is embodied in the Organizational Development and Management portion of the Human Resource Management Program. The Human Resource Management Program is one of five major programs within the Navy Human Goals Plan. The purpose of the Human Resource Management Program "is to provide to every unit the specific and detailed assistance that they want and need to develop that particular personnel management or leadership system which will best meet their unique needs and enable them to better utilize physical and human resources." [Ref. 14, p. B-1] Within this program, the Organizational Development and Management portion has the mission of providing commands with "assistance of trained specialists in organizational development to assist a command in increasing the overall performance of its personnel towards mission attainment and overall command excellence." [Ref. 14, p. B-3]

B. HISTORY

A chronological evolution of the Organizational Development and Management Program is contained in Appendix A.

C. TECHNOLOGY

1. Overview

The Navy's effort generally follows the phases discussed in section II, but the steps are labeled differently. An intervention model proposed by Kolb and Frohman is utilized by the Navy. The table below compares the steps identified in the KOLB-FROHMAN model with those that form the organization of this thesis:

<u>KOLB-FROHMAN</u>	<u>AUTHOR'S PHASES</u>
Scouting	Entry
Planning	Entry
Diagnosis	Data Collection/Diagnosis
Action	Data Feedback/Action
Evaluation	Evaluation
Termination	Withdrawal

These phases form the basis for the Human Resource Management Cycle. This cycle is graphically displayed in exhibit 8, Appendix B. The Human Goals Plan requires that each command in the operating force be scheduled: 1) annually for an initial survey, 2) a five consecutive day dedicated Human Resources Management period (referred to as the HRAV), 3) a six month follow-on visit. The Human Goals Plan also requires that each command develop a command action plan (CAP) for attainment of the Human Goals Plan objectives.

Each command is assisted in fulfilling these requirements by a Human Resource Management Center (HRMC) or a Human Resource Management Detachment (HRMD). The HRMC/HRMD is organizationally under the Fleet Commanders-In-Chief. Prior to assignment to the



HRMC/HRMD, personnel attend a twelve-week Human Resource Management School, located in Memphis, Tennessee. This school is designed to provide the skills and knowledge required of an OD consultant in the naval environment.

The Navy's organization development effort is based upon a change method called Survey-Guided Development (SGD). The method is a product primarily of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. This method conceptualizes the organization in a manner similar to Lawrence and Lorsch. That is, it is viewed as consisting of specialized groups which are linked to the next higher level via the superior who is himself a subordinate at that level. "Survey-guided development is based upon the theory that three factors need to be taken into account in an organizational development effort; the behavior(s) which are problematic, the conditions which create those behaviors, and the interventions or activities which will correct the conditions creating the problems." [Ref. 29, p. 1-2] Survey-guided development utilizes a questionnaire to ascertain certain dimensions within the organization. A great amount of emphasis is placed upon the correct diagnosis of the data. An accurate diagnosis should indicate the problem, its source, and its probable cause.

Once compiled and analyzed, the data are fed back to the organization. The data first goes to top management, who in turn feeds it further down the command structure via the "linker." Workshops are then designed to solve those problems which have been identified. The problems are dealt with by a group problem

solving method. The results of the problem solving sessions are then unified into a command action plan (CAP).

2. Entry

Referring to the HRM cycle flow diagram, steps 1a and 1b comprise the entry phase. Well before these steps commence, the command has knowledge via the Fleet Commander's Quarterly Employment Schedule that a five day HRAV has been scheduled. Approximately eight to ten weeks prior to the HRAV commencement date, step 1a is initiated. In most cases this is accomplished by a letter similar to that contained in exhibit 2, Appendix B. The letter discusses the HRM cycle and relates it to the Human Goals Plan. It provides the name of the lead consultant assigned to work with the command and other points of contact at the HRMC. It states and explains the preliminary events which should take place prior to the HRAV and proposes a schedule to accomplish them.

Step 1b is mutually arranged between the command and the lead consultant. In cases where the Commanding Officer of the unit is an O-6, the Commanding Officer of the HRMC usually is present during this visit. During this visit a more detailed briefing of the Human Goals Plan and the HRM cycle are provided. Details regarding the command survey are given and the command's assistance in implementing the survey is requested.

3. Data Collection

Data collection is represented by step 2 in the HRM cycle flow diagram. The primary vehicle for collecting data about the

command is a standard survey questionnaire. As stated earlier, the command is required to conduct the survey, however the survey may be supplemented by interviews. The survey is usually administered five to eight weeks prior to the commencement of the HRAV week. The standard questionnaire is given to all units participating in the HRM cycle.

The questionnaire was designed under Navy contract by personnel at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. At the time the case was observed the questionnaire consisted of 103 questions. However, it has subsequently been revised and at this writing consists of 88 questions. The answer sheet also allows the inclusion of 30 additional questions which the command has the option of utilizing. Finally, the questionnaire includes 14 demographic questions (e.g., race, age, paygrade, etc.). A copy of the survey questionnaire utilized in the case is included as exhibit 10, Appendix B.

The questionnaire was designed to measure the areas of concern defined in the Navy Human Goals Plan. Specifically, the questionnaire is designed to measure the following dimensions and indices (an explanation of each is provided as exhibit 11, Appendix B):

Command Climate

Communications Flow	Work Group Coordination
Decision Making	
Motivation	Satisfaction
Human Resources Emphasis	
Lower Echelon Initiative	Integration of Men and Mission
General	

Supervisor Leadership •

Support
Teamwork
Goal Emphasis
Work Facilitation

End Results

Training
Community Interrelationships
Race Relations/Equal Opportunity
Drug Abuse Education

Peer Leadership •

Support
Teamwork
Goal Emphasis
Work Facilitation


Alcohol Abuse Education
Career Counselling

4. Diagnosis

Diagnosis of the survey results is designed to be

accomplished within the framework of a model of an organization and a model of behavioral causal factors. The model used to view the organization is similar to Likert's "linker" concept and Lawrence and Lorsch's model of an organization. Essentially, the lowest level of the organization is composed of individuals grouped to perform a specialized task. The superior of this group is also viewed as a member of the group immediately above it in the hierarchial structure. This dual role of the group supervisor carries all the way up the command structure to the CO and XO. "The supervisor's linking function helps us understand how parts of the system fit together as a coherent, interacting whole." [Ref. 29, p. 6-7] This can be graphically displayed as shown on the next page:


COMMAND STRUCTURE BY LEVEL



It is through the "linker" that the formal processes of the organization travel. Specifically, the influence of such things as decisions, policies, rules, motivation and communications flow through the formal system via the linker. This not only highlights the importance of the linker within the system but this also plays an important role in assessing the data collected. The importance lies in the fact that those processes mentioned above reduce the latitude or set constraints for the

bounds within which the lower levels operate. The climate as exemplified by these processes sets the climate for lower level actions. Therefore, the fact that a problem is identified at a certain level within the structure does not necessarily mean that the cause also lies at this level. In fact, the model stresses that the cause is very likely to appear as a result of the climate produced by higher levels in the organization.

The members of ISR have found that the causal factors cannot be directly linked to one specific area. It is proposed that there are a number of factors that interact with varying degrees of influence. Within the context of the survey dimensions, they propose that command climate influences supervisor leadership, peer leadership and coordination. Peer leadership is also influenced by supervisor leadership and coordination, in turn, is influenced by peer leadership. Coordination then influences the end results of productivity, efficiency, performance and combat readiness. This can be graphically displayed as shown on the next page.



This causal flow pattern forms the heart of the diagnostic phase of the Navy's OD program. It is the identification of the causal factors which is the object of this phase. It should also be mentioned that this concept can also be used to view a subsystem (department, division, work group) within the system.

The data (an example of which is provided as exhibit 6, Appendix B) is analyzed within the framework provided by these concepts. However, an integral aspect of the Navy's diagnostic procedure deals with the comparison of a command's data with the norms of the Navy. These norms are generated as a result of a compilation of all survey results to date. At the time of this writing, the input data from all afloat commands which have

taken the survey are categorized into surface, subsurface and aviation norms. The command's mean score for each of the dimensions and indices is then compared with the normative mean scores of all surface ships, for example.

It is proposed that the difference between the individual command data and the Navy norms will provide the motivation for improvement. The dimensions that fall below the Navy's average for that particular area are considered to be dimensions that might be sources of problems. Once the source of the problem has been identified, then an attempt is made to identify the cause utilizing the causal flow concept. Tabulation of survey results by demographic and structural characteristics further allows the consultant to isolate problem areas.

The identification of bimodal distributions within the survey printout can also provide an excellent procedure for determining polarization of the command within a particular dimension. This added perspective can greatly contribute to a more complete diagnosis.

5. Data Feedback

Although based upon the principles of survey-guided development, in practice a variation may be adopted. The particular form depends upon the intended use of the survey diagnosis. The diagnosis could be used to design a series of workshops for the HRAV. On the other hand, it could be used in a manner which equates to a purer form of survey-guided development. In the latter case, the majority of the feedback process is conducted during the HRAV.

a. Variation of Survey-Guided Development

When the diagnosis is utilized to design a series of workshops for the five day HRAV, the following sequence of events normally take place. Before the consultant provides the command with the survey results, usually three to four weeks prior to the commencement date of the HRAV, he should offer an opportunity to familiarize the CO, and whom ever he may designate, with certain aspects of this phase of the program. The consultant should introduce the concepts upon which the diagnosis will be based. In addition, he should familiarize the CO with what the survey measures, the meaning of the survey indices and their causal relationship. An explanation of the norms to which the data will be compared is also important.

Having familiarized the Commanding Officer with the essential points, the data is presented. At this presentation, the major features of the data are highlighted by charts or other illustrations. (An example is provided as exhibit 1, Appendix B.) It is anticipated that the CO will then feed this information to the top level of the command structure. As a result of the consultant and CO discussions of the data and their meaning, it is hoped that the CO can, in turn, highlight those indices which he perceives as potential problem areas. The objective of this meeting is to decide what indices the command desires to improve upon. With this information, the consultant can then organize a series of workshops congruent with the command's desires.

b. Survey-Guided Development

The purer form of survey-guided development, on the other hand, devotes a considerable amount of time and effort to discussions about the potential problem areas as diagnosed from the survey, and their possible causes. As mentioned above, this process overlaps into the HRAV week (the action phase of the intervention). In fact, in this method, the feedback process is also viewed as the beginning of the action phase. As with the variation, a preliminary familiarization with the feedback process is necessary. However, rather than confining the discussions of the survey results to the objective of workshop design, the diagnosis is utilized more "to focus attention upon the weaker areas in command functioning and stimulate discussion of the systemic problems facing the command." [Ref. 29, p. 7-9].

5. Action

a. Survey-Guided Development

For pure survey-guided development, the action phase is a continuation or the start of the conferences discussed above. The results of these conferences should be a list of problems that effect the entire ship. (The same procedure could be simultaneously conducted for a subsystem of the command providing that sufficient resources were available.) The resultant list of problems are sanitized by removing those problems over which the command has no control. Additional problems may be deleted at the discretion of the CO. Once sanitized, the list

is then prioritized. In turn each problem is assigned to a group for the purpose of recommending solutions to the Commanding Officer. The solutions should identify what actions are necessary, who is responsible for the actions and by when the actions should be completed. The recommended solutions to the problems are then approved or modified by the CO. The solutions are then solidified into a Command Action Plan (CAP). The CAP is the final product of the action phase. It remains for the command then to implement the actions outlined in the CAP. A summary diagram of the complete survey-guided development process and alternative means of structuring it is provided in Appendix C.

b. Variation of Survey-Guided Development

If the variation of survey-guided development is followed, then the action phase usually consists of workshops designed to attack the problems initially identified by the survey. A listing of the typical workshops available at an HRMC is provided as exhibit 19, Appendix B. A workshop usually consists of a lecture or movie about a process or skill (e.g., communication). Very often a demonstration, usually in the form of a role-playing exercise, utilizing members of the command, is conducted to facilitate internalization of the concepts taught. These concepts are then brought into the context of the members' work environment by discussing their usefulness in the command. In many cases the members are asked to provide specific examples of areas where the command could benefit by practicing these concepts. Therefore, workshops usually attempt

to impart cognitive information reinforced with experiential learning exercises.

The Human Goals Plan requires that a command action plan be a product of the HRAV. Therefore, if the variation of survey-guided development is used, then in most cases a command action planning system (CAPS) workshop is included in the HRAV for the specific purpose of developing a CAP. This workshop begins by identifying problems. Problem identification is usually accomplished by individual inputs or by a peer group effort. From the problems that were generated, the CO selects those which he desires to concentrate on. Then, as in the pure survey-guided development method, groups are assigned the task of recommending solutions to those problems. Again these solutions are accepted or modified by the CO and the results are then unified into a CAP.

IV. CASE STUDY: USS THUNDERBOLT

A. INTRODUCTION

"Why do I need an HRAV? As you can see from the normative data (exhibit 1, Appendix B), I don't need an HRAV." These were the matter-of-fact type comments of the Commanding Officer, USS Thunderbolt to the lead consultant from the HRMC. These comments led off the HRAV planning conference held in the wardroom of the ship on 21 June 197X. The conference was attended by CO, XO and all department heads. Also present were two members of the staff of HRMC; CDR Al Reagan, 1310 (helo) and LT Bruce

Dunne, 1110. CDR Reagan was the team leader of Team # Z, one of six teams at HRMC. As such, he was the lead consultant for Thunderbolt's HRM cycle.

B. BACKGROUND

USS Thunderbolt had just recently returned to her homeport from a very successful WESTPAC deployment, and at the time of the HRAV planning conference, was nearing the completion of her 30 day stand-down period. Nevertheless, active preparation was being made for her upcoming yard overhaul which was scheduled to commence in August 197X. Although she was four years out of overhaul, she did pass the PEB. However, she now faced the trauma of ten months in the naval shipyard.

The Commanding Officer, CDR Dick Williamson, took command of Thunderbolt about six months before the HRAV week. He did not attend the usual prospective commanding officers (PCO) school, but instead reported directly to the ship. The Executive Officer, LCDR Ed Chappel, joined the ship two months later. His enroute training included PXO school. Both officers had been early selected to their present ranks. Both had Masters' degrees; the CO in International Affairs and the XO in Operations Research. This was CDR Williamson's third command. In talking about Thunderbolt, he once stated that "there was a spirit aboard her, however it was dormant. Since I've taken command, the spirit has been kindled and is now on top." He prided himself in his seamanship ability. He considered the use of tug and pilot warranted on some occasions, however all too often CO's used

them, he thought, because they lacked ability and confidence. As a result it was the exception rather than the rule to observe Thunderbolt assisted by tug or pilot. This, he felt, contributed greatly to sparking his crew's spirit.

He strongly advocated the use of the chain of command. In fact, most of his orders to the wardroom officers were directed through the executive officer. He believed that the XO should run the ship and the CO operate it. To outside observers, the CO and XO shared a very close relationship. CDR Reagan once remarked that he could count on the XO's thoughts to also be those of the CO. He also remarked, however, that there was no doubt who ran the ship.

It was not uncommon to hear CDR Williamson express the opinion that the UCMJ, payday, and liberty-call were the things that motivated a sailor. He had a reputation, on board, of being very tough at mast. In one instance, he fined one of his crew members \$100.00 for not saluting him on the pier. The XO once remarked that his workload was more than usual because of the number of Summary Court Martials that have been awarded at Captain's Mast. Grooming standards, on board, were in accordance with the letter of the book and strictly enforced by the duty master-at-arms who stood at the brow at liberty call. Since returning to homeport, the crew has been in four sections.

C. ENTRY

In accordance with the Fleet Commander's quarterly employment schedule, USS Thunderbolt was scheduled for an HRAV from 9-13

July 197X. However, as a result of an exchange of messages between the HRMC and the ship, Thunderbolt's HRM cycle actually started two months earlier while the ship was returning from a WESTPAC deployment. On 12 May 197X, Bos'n Harris, a member of the HRMC Team # Z, embarked two weeks prior to the ship's arrival in homeport. Upon arrival at the ship he delivered to the CO a letter from the Commanding Officer of the HRMC (exhibit 2, Appendix B). At 1630 that afternoon the ship shifted colors and started the final leg of its homeward trek. The following day Bos'n Harris briefed the CO and XO on the Human Resources Management cycle. During the brief, 12 handouts were referred to and subsequently given to the command (exhibits 3-14, Appendix B). Bos'n Harris summarized the briefing by stating that, " . . . the CO appeared skeptical and asked many questions with regard to the Human Goals Plan. He appeared to be satisfied with the answers provided and began to be somewhat supportive."

D. DATA COLLECTION

On the morning of 14 May, another meeting between Bos'n Harris and the CO and XO was held to decide when, how and where to administer the Human Goals Survey. It was decided here that due to insufficient time, the CO would not exercise his option to add supplemental questions to the survey. Bos'n Harris devoted that afternoon and most of the next day formulating a comprehensive wire diagram (exhibit 15, Appendix B) of the ship's organization. During the remaining days of the voyage, the

survey questionnaire was administered at seven different sessions to 240 out of the 253 man crew. The 13 members who did not take the survey were not aboard for various reasons. Bos'n Harris had one additional meeting with the CO and XO before the ship arrived at its homeport. This meeting was for the purpose of discussing how the survey data would be fed back to the ship. It was decided that the CO would receive the data himself and then pass it down to his XO and department heads. The date established for the feedback of the data was 5 June. The day before arriving at homeport, Bos'n Harris summarized the ship's commitment to the HRM cycle as follows: "CO, XO, Department Heads, and crew (except CPO's) appeared to be excited and enthusiastic about the Human Goals Program. Note: six (6) month deployment ends tomorrow."

E. DIAGNOSIS

After Thunderbolt's arrival at homeport and before the scheduled 5 June meeting, HRMC personnel processed and analyzed the data. The raw data on the survey answer sheets were optically scanned and transformed into punched cards at the HRMC. The punched cards were then hand-carried to NELC and transferred to a disc and processed through a program which produced the final printout of the survey results (exhibit 16, appendix B). The HRMC has access to the disc at NELC by remote terminal. This access can be used to delete and change data or to request additional printouts. The data on this disc is usually erased upon

completion of a unit's HRAV. The punched cards however were returned and are retained by the HRMC. While the data was on NELC's disc, NPRDC made a copy and stored it in a data bank which contains the survey results from all naval units. It was from this data bank that the normative data displayed in exhibit 1 was produced. Upon receiving the final printout, CDR Reagan spent about five hours analyzing the data. His diagnosis appears as exhibit 17, Appendix B. After completing his analysis, he relayed to his team members the results of his work. Bos'n Harris remarked that the survey results matched his opinion of the ship.

F. DATA FEEDBACK

Armed with the final survey printout and his analysis, he developed a detailed agenda in preparation for the 5 June feedback session. Upon arrival at the ship on that date, he and two other members of his team were introduced to the CO in his cabin. CDR Reagan summarized his first encounter with CDR Williamson in the following manner:

He (CDR Williamson) was very interested in getting right into the survey results. I had prepared a folder of information for him, but he didn't show much interest in the contents other than the graph I had prepared of the normative data and how the Thunderbolt compared. He then took his copy of the survey results and started through it. The short introduction I had planned around the feedback model of causal flow and linking pins was dropped. I let him have his head with the data, trying to give him instruction on the symbology and mechanics of the printout. The cabin arrangement was not conducive for working with him on his data. He held it in his lap while sitting across from us. It was difficult to see where he was in the data. After he had completed his



readout, I brought up the subject of confidentiality with him. He stated that he had contracted with CWO Harris for all of the data. He also started looking at the graph again. He had two indices that were below the 40th percentile that he was concerned about, and he became quite defensive about them and the normative data. I started to break out the departmental data when he decided that he wanted to get all the department heads and XO involved. So we moved to the wardroom to continue the brief. I went back over the symbology and mechanics of the printout for the benefit of the XO and the department heads, and gave each of them their departmental data. The CO was still having a problem with the normative data. He requested copies of all the overall command data for each of the department heads. He also requested a definition of each of the workshops we can put on. I offered whatever assistance the team could give him feeding back data to the command. He stated that he wanted time to look over the data and let his XO and department heads have time to look it over before he decided. All in all the meeting was rather stiff. The CO was denying some of the data and seemed reluctant to want to make any commitment around it or the HRM cycle. He was all business and no time was spent on small talk or amenities. The meeting did not go at all according to my original game plan to brief him on a model before giving him the data. 1

When he briefed his team, CDR Reagan commented that the meeting was the hardest that he had ever experienced.

The additional printouts (exhibit 18, Appendix B) and the list of workshops (exhibit 19, Appendix B) requested by CDR Williamson were delivered to him by CDR Reagan on 11 June.² At this meeting CDR Reagan asked if there were any questions regarding the data. There were none expressed by the CO. CDR Reagan again offered to assist in feeding the survey results to the department

¹It was known to the case writer, but not to the members of the HRMC that CO, Thunderbolt did not in general have a high regard for personnel that were initially assigned to HRMC associated programs.

²This was the first time that CDR Reagan had given a command a list of the workshops that were available at the HRMC.

heads. The CO again responded by stating that he intended to give each department head his data and would hold a meeting with them later that week to discuss the data.

A number of phone conversations between CDR Reagan and the XO resulted in establishing 21 June as the date for a conference to discuss and plan the contents of the HRAV week. That conference was led off by the comments contained in the first paragraph of the case. Other questions and comments that surfaced during this conference included: 1) Who goes to an HRAV; a particular work group? 2) What is the optimum number of people for an HRAV? 3) Some of my people claim that they didn't understand some of the terminology that was used in the questionnaire, 4) Can't department heads concentrate on their areas of particular concern during the HRAV?

After discussing these items, the CO then asked each department head to indicate what workshops they thought would do them the most good in light of the survey results. The following summarizes their reports:

OPERATIONS

Decision-Making
Motivation
Race
Drugs
Alcohol

WEAPONS

Communications
Motivation
Race
Drugs
Alcohol

ENGINEERING

Goals and Plans
Motivation
Race
Drugs
Alcohol

SUPPLY

Peer group/Intergroup
Team Building
Mirroring Exercise
Goals and Plans
Communications

The CO wrote these inputs on a chalk board. After about 45 minutes of discussion, the CO had developed what CDR Reagan considered an unusual plan for an HRAV week. CDR Reagan had been lead consultant for seven HRAV's (average one per month) and had participated as a team member in others. He had not experienced a request such as this. Normally a ship would select a group of from 30-36 people representing a vertical cross section of the ship to participate as an intact group throughout the entire week. In fact this is what he had suggested to CDR Williamson. Nevertheless, he eagerly assured the CO that it was an innovative plan and that he thought that it would work. CDR Williamson's plan is described in the following paragraph.

For the first two days of the week there were four groups (A, B, C, and D) of 32 men each. On the first day, group A received a half-day communications workshop in the morning and a half-day motivation workshop in the afternoon at HRMC's conference room. Group B received the same workshops but attended them in a building adjacent to HRMC's headquarters. Simultaneously groups C and D attended a four hour session dedicated to Race Relations Education and Drug and Alcohol Abuse. This session was conducted in a building near where the ship was moored. On the second day of the HRAV week, teams A and B received the Race, Drug and Alcohol Abuse seminars while teams C and D received the Communications and Motivation workshops. Consequently, all four groups experienced the four seminars. Wednesday and Thursday was dedicated to a Command Action Planning System (CAPS) workshop.

One group of 32 men (all of whom had been members of either group A, B, C or D during the previous two days) attended this two-day workshop. The CAPS workshop was designed to provide inputs for Thunderbolt's Command Action Plan. Friday morning was utilized to unify the output of the two-day CAPS workshop into a rough Command Action Plan. This session was attended by the CO, XO, CMA, MCPOC, RAFT, the Weapons Officer and 3 of the 4 CAP team leaders. A diagram of the week's plan is presented below:

<u>MONDAY</u>		<u>TUESDAY</u>		<u>WEDNESDAY</u>	<u>THURSDAY</u>	<u>FRIDAY</u>
Com(A)	Com(B)	Com(C)	Com(D)			
Mot(A)	Com(B)	Mot(C)	Mot(D)	C	C	Unify
-----	-----	-----	-----	A	A	plan
						half-day
	Race(C)		Race(A)	P	P	
AM	Drugs(C)	AM	Drugs(A)			
	Alcohol(C)		Alcohol(C)	S	S	
-----	-----	-----	-----			
	Drugs(D)		Drugs(B)			
PM	Race(D)	PM	Race(B)			
	Alcohol(D)		Alcohol(B)			

The Supply Officer made arrangements with Team # Z to conduct a mirroring exercise sometime after the HRAV week.

G. ACTION

The Commanding Officer of the HRMC kicked off the HRAV week by welcoming Thunderbolt's crew and explained why they were there. In part, he stated that studies have shown a need to sit back and take a look at yourselves and to evaluate special interest items such as race and drugs. Therefore higher authority has

directed you to utilize this week to take a look at your ship. He continued by stating that the HRMC tries to operate as an assist ship and expressed the hope that as a result, things on board could be done in a more orderly and efficient manner. He hastened to add that this is not a substitute for leadership by saying that no matter how good management is, leadership, especially the CO's, has to make the decisions.

CDR Williamson followed by telling his crew that he had told the Commanding Officer of the Human Resources Management Center that he didn't think that Thunderbolt needed an HRAV.³ He then showed the crew the graph of the normative data and explained how Thunderbolt compared with the rest of the fleet. He continued by saying that as a result of a conversation with the Commanding Officer of the HRMC and after giving it a lot of thought he now felt that the HRAV provided a chance for Thunderbolt to become an even better ship.³ He stated that the object of this week was to make us more efficient. He told them that he wanted them to take a close look at the way we do things. He said that gripes should be brought out into the open. He further stated that there should be no fear of reprisals, but that this does not mean a license for disrespect.

The CAPS workshop was scheduled for the third day of the HRAV. While everyone was getting settled in the conference room

³CDR Williamson had served with the Commanding Officer of the HRMC at a previous duty station and had a great deal of respect for him.

on that day, a short discussion was taking place in the back of the conference room between CDR Reagan and CDR Williamson. The discussion centered around the initial procedures for the CAPS workshop. After a few words were exchanged CDR Reagan proceeded to the front of the room and began to instruct the crew that each individual would list those things which he wanted to see changed on the ship ("I wants"). No sooner had he told the crew this, than, from the back of the room, the CO interrupted by stating that that was not what he wanted. He expressed his desire to have the problems generated by peer groups rather than by individuals. CDR Reagan hesitated for a moment and then responded by saying that it was just as easy to do it that way. He then changed his instructions to the crew and stated that it would only take a couple of minutes to get his list of the crew members so that he could identify the peer groups. Again the CO, from the back of the room, remarked that all that had to be done was to divide the crew members according to rank. The CO then proceeded to the front of the room and began grouping the crew by rank on the black board. A scheme was finally devised that divided the 32 members into four peer groups as follows:

GROUP I	-	Officers/Master & Senior Chiefs/ CPO's/P01's
GROUP II	-	P02
GROUP III	-	P03
GROUP IV	-	E-2/E-3

These groups were tasked to deliver to the CO a list of those things that they wanted to see changed on the ship ("we wants").

Once the list was completed they were then tasked to prioritize the three items of most concern to them.

Prior to commencing, the CO told them that he wanted them to be honest and that this was their change^c to be heard. He also stated that he wanted to hear nothing about the hair length policy, however the manner in which the policy was carried out was fair game. After the CO's comments the above teams adjourned into separate rooms (diagram of HRAV conference room is contained in exhibit 20, Appendix B).

After working approximately 45 minutes, the teams assembled in the main conference room. There, each group's spokesman in turn made an oral presentation to the CO and the entire group regarding his team's list. The results of the peer group "we wants" are summarized in exhibit 21, Appendix B.

Thereafter the CO, XO and CDR Reagan adjourned to a separate room. There, the CO was requested to choose 8 of the problems presented as ones he would like worked on. Meanwhile the crew members were briefed on a six step problem-solving and action-planning method. The objective of this six step procedure was to produce a realistic plan for the solution of a given problem. Additionally, new team assignments were made. No longer would the teams be composed of peers but rather as vertically integrated teams as indicated in exhibit 22, Appendix B.

The CO emerged from the room after reviewing the issues that were identified and assigned the following four items to the groups indicated:

TEAM A

We need to improve assignment of working party and mess cook procedures.

TEAM B

We need to improve indoctrination of newly reported men.

TEAM C

We need to improve special request chit procedures.

TEAM D

We need to improve watch bill coordination.

At this time the CO commented to the entire group that although I've only chosen 8 of the issues, I want to assure you that all issues will be looked at closely and feedback on all will be given back to you. He once again emphasized that no one should have any fear of reprisal and that everyone who has something to say should speak up regardless of rank or rate. He also stated that he was surprised at some of the items which surfaced, but not with others.

Having been given their assignments each team proceeded to separate rooms to work on a plan. The senior man on each team was designated as the team leader and was responsible for the coordination and output of the team's efforts. Each team was assigned a staff member from the HRMC. Each member of the staff was familiar with the six step procedure and facilitated as necessary. For the next 5-6 hours the teams laboriously attempted to cope with the new procedure in applying it to the problem which they had been assigned. With the help of the staff facilitators, they managed to grope through the procedure and were

ready at about 1500 that afternoon to report their plan to the CO and the members of the other teams. Exhibit 23, Appendix B summarizes their plans. The CO commented at the completion of each team's presentation. One recurring comment pointed to the fact that procedures to cope with these issues were already in existence, but evidently they aren't being carried out or the procedures are not being enforced.

Before departing for the day, the CO assigned the four issues which were to be tackled the next day. The issues and team assignments were as follows:

TEAM A

We need to improve consistency of liberty procedure.

TEAM B

We need to improve awareness of respect.

TEAM C

We need to improve information flow of middle management.

TEAM D

We need to improve information flow of line management.

On the following morning the team members went directly to their designated team rooms and commenced tackling that day's task. The issues this day were a bit more vague than the previous ones. Therefore time was initially spent clarifying the meaning of the issue. The teams were more comfortable with the six step procedure and therefore needed less facilitation from the staff members. By 1430 all teams were ready to report to the CO. Their plans are summarized in exhibit 24, Appendix B. Some of

the group leaders, when making their presentations to the CO, stated that they would like to continue working on the problem, as a group, in the coming months.

V. CASE STUDY DISCUSSION

A. ENTRY

1. Deviations from Procedures Instituted by the Navy

The ship was deployed at the time the initial entry took place (8-10 weeks prior to the HRAV). This fact required a departure from the normal entry procedures in two ways. First, the initial introductory letter to the CO (step 1a) occurred simultaneously with the initial visit (step 1b), rather than being separated by a period of time. This departure, in and of itself, is not considered significant enough to be detrimental to the effort. However, the execution of step 1a and 1b in the back-to-back fashion in which it was accomplished left little time for the CO to ponder the program and its possible impact on his command. Secondly, and of particular significance, was the fact that the lead consultant did not conduct the initial visit. This fact may have had a considerable effect on the relationship that eventually developed between CDR Williamson and CDR Reagan. (This relationship will be discussed more fully in the section that follows.)

The reasons for departing from the normal procedures are not contained in the case. The following reasons were provided by the lead consultant for this departure. The initial contact

was not made by the lead consultant because at that time he was involved in the delivery of an HRAV to another unit. The decision to conduct the entry phase in this manner was based on a couple of key factors. First, it was considered that the period of time between data collection and the HRAV would have been too compressed if the survey was conducted after the ship's arrival in homeport. Secondly, it was thought that it might be difficult to obtain a wide coverage by administering the questionnaire during the post deployment standdown.

2. Comparison with Literature

To assess the preconditions of the client, it is helpful to look at the characteristics of the Commanding Officer of the ship. From the background information in the case, it can be surmised that the CO displayed the following characteristics:

tremendous pride in himself and ship,
professionally competent,
strong disciplinarian,
strong advocate of the chain of command,
strongly committed to the organization and its traditions,
not previously exposed to the concepts of organization
development.

In summary, it can be concluded that he was a "hard driving," successful Naval Officer. He tended to be very authoritarian and appeared to run his ship from the top down. In terms of the "readiness" of the organization, as personified by the CO, it could be said that: 1) knowledge of OD was low, 2) the culture, especially the rewards and punishment variable was not congruent with that of OD, 3) there was little felt need for change.

Assessment of the relationship building cannot be confined to the events that occurred during the entry phase but rather the entire effort must be viewed in order to come to any clear conclusions. Initial defensiveness was displayed by the CO in Bos'n Harris' description of his first visit with CDR Williamson. However, it appeared that rapport was being built between he and the CO. This is supported by the fact that the CO seemed to be satisfied with the explanations regarding the Human Goals Plan and by Bos'n Harris' summary of the command's commitment to the Human Goals Plan.

CDR Reagan's summary of his first encounter with the CO indicates that they did not immediately strike a cordial relationship. Reinforcement of this conclusion is found at the end of his statement that the meeting was stiff and also by the fact that he relayed to his team members that the meeting had been the hardest that he had experienced.

As the intervention proceeded, one gets the indication that their relationship never really solidified into a collaborative one. The incident at the beginning of the CAPS workshop where there was a misunderstanding about problem identification procedures indicated that communication between them was strained and not very interactive. The fact that CDR Williamson interrupted CDR Reagan to correct the misunderstanding could also indicate that they had probably not attained a power-equal relationship.

At the opening session of the HRAV week, CDR Williamson openly stated that he was not convinced of the need for an HRAV

until after he had talked to the CO of the HRMC and had given it more thought. The footnote regarding a past working relationship between the two CO's might have been a major influencing factor in the outcome of that discussion. However, the fact that CDR Williamson went to another individual could also indicate a lack of mutual trust and respect between he and CDR Reagan.

There is nothing in the case that would lead one to conclude, because CDR Reagan was an aviator, that this contributed to the problem. However, it is considered that this fact may have had a negative affect on the effort. This observation is made to indicate that a CO of a surface combatant might perceive an aviator as not having a keen appreciation for the workings of a small ship.

Of primary importance to the understanding of the CO-consultant relationship is the statement that the case writer makes in a footnote regarding the CO's opinion of personnel associated with Pers P programs. The Pers P organization was not perceived by the CO as having an enviable reputation. Even though the HRMC was under the command of the Fleet Commander-in-Chief, Pers P's prior and present influence in the effort was known to the CO, and in most cases is common knowledge. This might have contributed to a lack of trust, and respect for the consultant.

CDR Reagan's comment concerning the crew's cooperation is indicative of the fact that the content portion of the contract was fulfilled. However, based upon the preceeding discussion

regarding the relationship, it is concluded that the psychological contract was never made. It is very likely that the HRM cycle was viewed as a required evolution and therefore carried out in that vein. This could explain the keeping of the content portion of the contract.

In summary, it is concluded that the necessary preconditions of knowledge, organizational culture, and felt need were not present. Reference is made to Bennis' comment that "one of the best ways to diagnose the cultural readiness has to do with the way the client system reacts to and establishes a relationship with the change agent." The relationship could not be characterized as open, honest, trusting, or collaborative, but rather as distrustful, non-interactive and not power-equal. The relationship that developed in this case supports Bennis' conclusion. However, this case points out other important contributing factors which pertain more to the preconditions of the consultant rather than the client organization. First, the CO did not, in general, have a high regard for personnel assigned to organizations associated with Pers P. Second, the additional possibility that as an aviator, the consultant might not have been considered sufficiently aware of small ship operations to be of assistance. Finally, in this particular case, one relationship began to take shape only to be interrupted during a latter stage of the effort. The content portion of the contract was made and carried out, but the psychological portion was never made. In consideration of the above, it is concluded that the entry

phase was not successful. Again referring to Bennis who stated that "the problems that inhere in that relationship are probably symptomatic of the problems to be encountered." Therefore, an analysis of the entry phase predicts problems for a successful change effort in this case.

B. DATA COLLECTION

The standard questionnaire was the only means utilized to collect data. The CO evidently did not feel that sufficient time existed to add supplemental questions. It is not clear, from the case, what particular pressures existed to cause this feeling. Bos'n Harris' time on board could have been utilized to collect additional data. It appeared that the data he might have collected was unstructured and only used in summary form. His statement that the survey results confirmed his opinion of the ship supports this observation.

C. DIAGNOSIS AND DATA FEEDBACK

The inability to formulate a collaborative relationship had a tremendous affect on the data feedback and diagnosis phases. The concepts under which the consultant was operating never were able to be explained. His role in the feedback process appeared to be limited to explaining the mechanics of the printout to the members of the command. The consultant was essentially excluded from presenting his diagnosis or of contributing in a meaningful manner in the feedback process. As a result

the diagnosis and interpretation was essentially generated from within the command; it was not a collaborative process.

The case indicates that the data was internally fed from CO/XO to department heads and that department heads received more detailed printouts of their particular workgroups. It is difficult to determine the extent to which the data was fed beyond the department head level.

The normative data became the focal point for the Commanding Officer. He became defensive about the two indices which fell below the Navy norm. However, the fact that the remaining indices fell within the mean of the normative profile could have contributed greatly to his explicit lack of motivation to continue with the OD effort. The normative graph so occupied the CO, that it overshadowed the data printout and its interpretation.

D. ACTION

The pure form of survey-guided development was not used for the action phase. Instead the variation which utilized the diagnosis to design a series of workshops was used. Because of the lack of a collaborative relationship and the fact that the data did not motivate a desire for change, it was probably better that the variation was pursued. On the other hand, the supply department's data indicated that it was an ideal target for a subsystem survey-guided development effort.

The problems identified during the CAPS workshop bore little resemblance to the consultant's diagnosis. This raises the



following questions: 1) is the survey valid? 2) does it measure what is important? 3) is the wording sufficiently shipboard oriented?.

The diagonal slice chosen to participate in the CAPS workshop only contained two officers neither of which were department heads. Therefore, the policy-influencing personnel were not included. This could explain the relatively large number of committees recommended by the problem-solving teams. For a command with a leadership style that is definitely top-down, it would have been better to take a slice of the organization at a higher level.

The fact that some of the group leaders expressed a desire to continue working on the problems after the HRAV terminated indicates that the individuals were deeply involved in meaningful areas. It is also indicative that group ownership did exist. This is the most optimistic sign that the effort could have been successful.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

Ideally, generalities should be drawn from a series of case studies. When this is done, commonalities between the different cases provide a sturdy base upon which to draw conclusions. Due to time constraints, only one case was observed. It should also be pointed out that the conclusions have been drawn from one

person's perception. Although the author is satisfied with the objectivity of the research, personal bias may be present.

B. ENTRY

1. Conclusions

- a. Insufficient emphasis is being placed on the entry phase●●

The literature emphasizes the critical nature of the entry phase. For a successful OD effort, the interaction between the client and the consultant during this phase forms the basis for a collaborative relationship. The necessity for this type of relationship is fully documented in the literature. It appears from the case that the bulk of the Navy's OD effort is concentrated in other than the entry phase. Considering its cruciality, a greater emphasis should be placed on the elements of entry during the HRM cycle. More energy and effort should be spent in this phase in order to enhance achieving the necessary collaborative relationship.

In expending this energy, consideration should be given to the priorities of the client during the entry phase.● In most cases, the client will likely be under considerable constraints due to operational commitments.●

- b. Certain preconditions of both client and consultant are required to support the necessary collaborative relationship


The literature is explicit in its treatment of the client preconditions necessary for the required relationship.



It stresses that the client should have, 1) some knowledge of OD, 2) a felt need for change or improvement, 3) a culture congruent with the values of the consultant. The case of the USS Thunderbolt supports the literature in this respect. The lack of these preconditions contributed to the unsuccessful attainment of a collaborative relationship.

Reading the conventional literature leads one to believe that the only preconditions necessary are those that pertain to the client. However, the case illustrates that a non-voluntary OD effort requires not only the client but also the consultant organization to meet certain preconditions. The case indicates two main factors which are considered necessary preconditions for the consultant. First, many fleet personnel do not look favorably upon the HRMC and its associated programs. This is due in part to negative reactions to previous programs, especially in the area of equal opportunity. For many, Human Goals is synonymous with equal opportunity programs. Secondly, the professional sea-going background of some of the officers initially associated with the organization responsible for the human goals programs was incongruent with the client that he has to interact with. The additive affect of these two factors created a credibility gap between the "fleet sailor" and the "Human Goals people."

Considering the preconditions of both the client and the consultant, the entry phase for the Navy's OD effort can be graphically displayed as shown below:



2. Recommendations

The inadequacies expressed in the above conclusions could be greatly alleviated by improving both the client and consultant preconditions. The following recommendations are proposed as possible means for accomplishing this improvement.

a. Improvement of consultant preconditions

In order to improve the consultant preconditions, both problems mentioned above have to be attacked. A possible solution to the first problem may be to separate or disassociate command development (OD) from the equal opportunity effort. If this appears economically infeasible, then a shift from the presently perceived emphasis of equal opportunity to one that stresses command development is recommended. A fully successful command development effort will have as a result racial awareness and equal opportunity.

The second problem should be attacked by attracting professionally competent warfare specialists as consultants. To accomplish this requires that duty in this area be perceived as career-enhancing. Otherwise, the here-to-for successful and upward mobile officer will not desire duty in this area. The

needs of the service and encouragement from the Navy's top echelon saw the turnaround in the perception of recruiting duty. The same type of effort would be needed.

Although organizational processes are common to all commands the environment and the demands under which they are carried out vary quite substantially depending upon the warfare specialty. The outsider may see "One Navy." In reality however, the level at which the OD effort is being targeted, parochialism prevails to a great extent. Therefore consultant preconditions could be enhanced by matching client and consultant warfare specialties to the maximum extent.

b. Improvement of client preconditions

The client should be more knowledgeable about what OD is, its objectives and methods employed to attain these objectives. This requires that key personnel in the command be educated prior to commencement of the HRM cycle; suggesting that OD education should take place during enroute training. Rather than establishing a separate school requiring additional expenditure of PCS funds, the possibility of incorporating this education in PXO/PCO schools, SWOS, and officer entrance schools, for example should be explored. The methods of OD are rather difficult to fully grasp in a lecture presentation. Derr's experience in a city's school system suggests that an OD-type workshop could be extremely beneficial. Therefore a half-day, non-threatening workshop conducted by a visiting OD consultant may be sufficient exposure to OD methods for future clients.

The fact that the Navy, as an organization, sought help from OD consultants indicates a felt need in the aggregate, but this does not necessarily mean that the individual unit command will feel the need. If the need does not initially exist, the survey results could produce it. However, rather than rely on the survey results to point out discrepancies and thereby induce a felt need, it would appear far better if key personnel could be informed and convinced of the value of OD prior to undergoing an HRAV (preferably before reporting aboard). The emphasis of the education should be that the HRM cycle provides a time to sit back in order to take a look at the perceived effects of the command's management processes.

Until the above long term remedies can take affect, the use of short term actions will have to suffice. To the extent possible, the above education should be attempted during the entry phase. An entry workshop similar to that referred to by Derr might be considered. A CNO personal letter to all Flag Officers, Unit Commanders, and Commanding Officers explaining OD principles might be a useful educational tool. It would also appear that the HRMC could arrange to conduct half-day seminars with Squadron Commanders and their Commanding Officers. An anecdotal success story written by a CO for publication in the Naval Institute Proceedings might also pay great dividends. • ✕

In summary, it appears that education will improve client preconditions. The fact that the consultant must vie with other priority items which consume the client's time during the



entry phase makes it imperative that this education take place as much as possible prior to entry.

C. DATA COLLECTION

1. Conclusion

- a. Multiple data sources will add to diagnostic perspective

The use of additional data to corroborate or refute the survey results would give an additional diagnostic perspective of the command.

2. Recommendation

To accomplish this requires the Commanding Officer's cooperation. With more knowledge of the methods of OD, CO's will be more prone to see the advantages of multiple data sources.

D. DIAGNOSIS AND DATA FEEDBACK

1. Conclusion

- a. Lack of collaborative relationship adversely affects diagnosis and data feedback

The diagnosis and feedback phases of this case illustrate the need for a collaborative relationship. The lack of its existence contributed to the inability to affect a joint, interactive and meaningful diagnosis.

- b. In cases where normative profile fails to produce the intended motivation for change, additional data displays may be necessary

In the Thunderbolt case, the command's data fell within most of the fleet means. As a result the Commanding Officer was not motivated for change or improvement. If the CO's reaction


to the normative data display is a typical response, then the cumulative affect would appear to drive towards mediocrity throughout the fleet. In cases where the normative display does not produce the intended motivation, additional displays or ways of looking at the data appear to be needed.

2. Recommendation


More effort and energy should be exerted during the entry phase on establishing a collaborative relationship.

In cases where the normative display does not produce motivation, back-up displays should be utilized. Rather than using the fleet mean, the command's mean could be used as a basis for comparison. In the Thunderbolt case, effective use of this comparison could have been made by utilizing a cumulative difference display. This type of display may be especially useful for dimensions which exhibit a bimodal distribution. As an example, a cumulative difference graph for the communication flow index for Thunderbolt would appear as shown in figure VI-I. As it appears in the survey printout the information displayed in figure VI-I resides on three different pages in the form of three different frequency distributions. The frequency distributions are shown in figure VI-II as a means of contrasting the impact of the cumulative difference displays with the frequency distributions as they appear in the printout.


COMMUNICATION FLOW (Cumulative Differences)



BY AGE:



BY RACE:



1. American Indian
2. Black
3. Guam/Phil/Malay
4. Spanish Descent
5. White

By Department:

J NO.	CNO MEAN	ADMIN	ENGINEER	OPS	SUPPLY	WEAPONS	X. O.	C. O.
1. DIMENSION: COMMAND CLIMATE				INDEX: COMMUNICATIONS FLOW				
37	2.73		2.52	2.75	2.55	2.47	3.13*	
38	3.05		3.03	3.18	2.77	2.75	3.00	
39	2.55		2.74	2.98	2.53	2.69	4.00*	
AVE	2.67		2.80	3.04	2.62	2.70	3.38	
CHI	230	200	53	58	31	58	8	100

By Age:

J NO.	CNO MEAN	17 TO 20	21 TO 24	25 TO 29	30 TO 34	OVER 35
1. DIMENSION: COMMAND CLIMATE				INDEX: COMMUNICATIONS FLOW		
37	2.74	2.74	2.48	2.85	3.11*	3.17*
38	3.05	3.17	2.74	3.16	3.00	3.13
39	2.55	2.79	2.51	3.31*	3.54*	3.75*
AVE	2.67	2.88	2.69	3.04	3.22	3.36
CHI	230	29	32	32	27	17

By Race:

J NO.	CNO MEAN	ASIAN ISLAND	BLACK	MALAYAN FILIPINO	SPANISH DESCENT	WHITE	CHINESE JAPANESE	POLYNES. SAMOAN
1. DIMENSION: COMMAND CLIMATE				INDEX: COMMUNICATIONS FLOW				
37	2.76	2.83	2.51	3.00	2.91	2.74		
38	3.05	3.13	3.00	3.25	3.36	3.04		
39	2.55	2.72	2.74*	3.43*	3.00	2.87		
AVE	2.67	2.84	2.58	3.23	3.09	2.88		
CHI	230	8	16	8	11	173	0	0

Frequency Distributions as they appear in Survey Printout
FIGURE VI-II

E. ACTION

1. Conclusion

- a. The use of survey-guided development or its variation should depend on an assessment of the client-consultant relationship.

The case illustrates that without a collaborative relationship optimistic signs of involvement and ownership did result. It is proposed that similar results might not have occurred had pure survey-guided development been utilized in this case. This suggests that the choice between survey-guided development and its variation might rest on an evaluation of the client-consultant relationship up to the point of data feedback. If the relationship is assessed as truly collaborative, then survey-guided development should be utilized, otherwise its variation should be used.

- b. Crew member's increased awareness of the complexity involved in shipboard management is important side benefit of CAPS workshop

Although not brought out in the case, it was the author's observation that a major side benefit of the CAPS workshop was the participants' increased awareness of the complexities involved in running an effective and responsive shipboard management program. A probable result could be that while the command is being responsive to its members, the members may at the same time become more responsive to the command because of their increased awareness. In the process of educating clients, this point should be brought to light.

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

1. 5 November 1970: NAVOP Z-55 solicited applications from all Navy personnel with academic or experienced backgrounds in management and the applied behavioral sciences for the Human Resource Management Pilot Program.
2. 29 December 1970: The selection of 13 officers and 11 enlisted men from over 1,200 applications for this program was completed.
3. 18 January 1971: The 24 personnel selected reported to the Naval Chaplain School, NS Newport, Rhode Island, for the initial eight weeks training and the formation of the Human Resource Management Pilot Program.
4. 1 March 1971: Project Manager, Human Relations Project (BUPERS-Pc) established as overall Project Manager for developing programs in Drug Abuse Education and Rehabilitation, Race Relations, Intercultural Relations, and Human Resource Management Programs.
5. 1 April 1971: Human Resource Management Pilot Program occupied own quarters, NS Newport, Rhode Island, began to develop its own organization, and define its mission.
6. July 1971: First Management Development Training Seminars conducted by the Human Resource Management Pilot Program.
7. September 1971: Initial definition of Human Resource Management Pilot Program mission as implementing organizational development efforts within the operational forces of the Navy.
8. December 1971: Development of specific organizational development program for application within the Navy called the Command Development Program. Writing the "N-Man Book" begun.

9. January 1972: "N-Man Book" published. Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla TWO engaged as Pilot's operational client. Initial application of Command Development Program.
10. March 1972: Human Resource Management Pilot Program terminated and transition to command status as Human Resource Development Center, NS Newport, Rhode Island. Human Resource Development Centers at San Diego, Norfolk, and Pearl Harbor established within six months.
11. April 1972: First Command Development Specialist Training cycle to train Navy personnel in management consultant techniques for expanded program implementation.
12. December 1972: Completion of Pilot Program implementation within COMCRUDESFLOT TWO sustained program expansion through implementation at Human Resource Development Centers.
13. January 1973: Initial staffing of the Human Resource Management Team, Washington, D. C., for application of organizational development technology within Washington Shore Establishment.
14. February 1973: Transition of Command Development Program to Organizational Development and Management Program offering full management consulting services and organizational development technology to the naval establishment with flexibility to meet the needs of each command.
15. April 1973: Establishment of the Human Goals Office under the CNO, utilizing the Human Resource Management Program as the framework for all Human Goals Programs, including Race Relations Education, Drug and Alcohol Abuse Education, Intercultural Relations, and Transition to civilian life.

APPENDIX B
CASE EXHIBITS

- Exhibit 1 - Normative Data
- Exhibit 2 - CO to CO Introductory Letter
- Exhibit 3 - The Why, the What, and the How of the Navy Human Goals Plan
- Exhibit 4 - Department of Defense Human Goals Credo
- Exhibit 5 - CNO LTR. DTD 19 October 1973, Personal to all Flag Officers, Unit Commanders, Commanding Officers
- Exhibit 6 - Chief of Naval Personnel Cover Article in the Officer Personnel Newsletter of December 1973
- Exhibit 7 - ALPACFLT 003/74
- Exhibit 8 - Human Resources Management Cycle Flow Diagram
- Exhibit 9 - Excerpts from U. S. Navy Human Goals Plan
- Exhibit 10 - Navy Human Resource Management Survey Questionnaire
- Exhibit 11 - Definition of Survey Dimensions and Indices
- Exhibit 12 - CNO MSG Regarding Confidentiality of Human Resource Management Survey Information
- Exhibit 13 - Biographical Information on HRM Support Team # Z
- Exhibit 14 - "Human Relations or Human Resources?" Harvard Business Review
- Exhibit 15 - USS Thunderbolt Organization Wire Diagram
- Exhibit 16 - Survey Printout
- Exhibit 17 - Consultant's Diagnosis of Survey Printout
- Exhibit 18 - Additional Survey Printouts
- Exhibit 19 - Seminars/Workshops Available at the HRMC

- Exhibit 20 - Diagram of HRMC Conference Room Arrangement
- Exhibit 21 - Peer Group "We Wants"
- Exhibit 22 - Six-step Action Planning Teams
- Exhibit 23 - First Set of Action Plans
- Exhibit 24 - Second Set of Action Plans

SURFACE FLEET FORMS AS OF
COMMAND DIMENSION/INDEX NORMY COMPARISON

	COMMAND CLIMATE	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	
COMMAND FUNCTIONING	1. Communication Flow	1.66	1.97	2.32	2.66	2.67	3.00	3.32	3.46	3.96			50
	2. Decision Making	1.66	1.99	2.32	2.66	2.67	2.99	3.00	3.33	3.67			54
	3. Motivation	1.49	1.75	2.24	2.69	2.74	2.99	3.25	3.74	4.00			54
	4. Human Resources Emphasis	1.00	1.49	1.99	2.60	2.49	2.50	3.00	3.49	3.99			65
	5. Lower Echelon Initiative	1.00	1.99	2.00	2.69	2.50	2.99	3.00	3.49	3.99			55
	6. Command Climate General	1.49	1.75	2.00	2.69	2.50	2.99	3.00	3.49	3.75			56
COMMAND FUNCTIONING	SUPERVISOR LEADERSHIP												
	7. Support	1.83	2.49	2.82	3.00	3.32	3.66	3.83	4.16	4.50			48
	8. Teamwork	1.49	2.00	2.50	2.69	3.00	3.49	3.99	4.00	4.50			39
	9. Goal Emphasis	2.00	2.50	3.00	3.69	3.50	3.99	4.00	4.49	4.99			38
	10. Work Facilitation	1.33	1.99	2.32	2.66	2.99	3.32	3.33	3.67	4.32			45
COMMAND FUNCTIONING	PEER LEADERSHIP												
	11. Support	2.32	2.99	3.00	3.33	3.66	3.99	4.00	4.32	4.67			45
	12. Teamwork	1.66	2.00	2.33	2.66	2.99	3.32	3.66	3.67	4.32			50
	13. Goal Emphasis	1.49	2.00	2.49	2.69	3.00	3.49	3.50	3.99	4.00			54
COORDINATION MEASURE	14. Work Facilitation	1.66	2.00	2.32	2.66	2.67	3.00	3.32	3.66	3.99			57
	15. Work Group Coordination	2.26	2.57	2.60	3.13	3.29	3.56	3.70	3.86	4.28			54
HUMAN GOALS	END RESULTS MEASURES												
	16. Satisfaction	1.82	2.32	2.50	2.63	3.16	3.49	3.67	4.00	4.33			52
	17. Integration of Men & Mission	0.67	0.75	1.00	1.66	1.67	2.00	2.62	2.99	3.60			78
	18. End Results	1.68	2.00	2.39	2.60	2.80	3.19	3.39	3.60	4.00			54
	19. Training	2.28	2.57	2.86	3.13	3.29	3.50	3.70	3.86	4.28			64
HUMAN GOALS	HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS												
	20. Overseas Diplomacy	1.71	2.00	2.29	2.66	2.77	3.00	3.28	3.56	3.86			74
	21. Race Relations/ Equal Opportunity	2.08	2.38	2.62	2.64	3.00	3.22	3.38	3.68	4.00			69
	22. Drug Abuse Education	2.19	2.50	2.60	2.60	3.00	3.39	3.45	3.79	4.19			57
	23. Alcohol Abuse Education	2.50	2.82	3.00	3.17	3.33	3.56	3.82	4.16	4.49			55
	24. Career Counselling	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.50	2.10	2.49	2.99	3.49			82
	25. Specific Command Questions	NO NORMATIVE DATA AVAILABLE											

EXHIBIT 1

23:JJC:CA
5350
Ser 648
10 May 197X

Commander D. K. Williamson
Commanding Officer
USS Thunderbolt
FPO San Francisco 96601

Dear Commander Williamson:

Your command, as a result of scheduling at the recent Fleet Commander's quarterly scheduling conference, has been scheduled for a dedicated Human Resource Availability (HRAV) during the week 9-13 July 197X. My purpose in writing is to give you some appreciation of what the Human Resource Management Cycle entails under the Navy Human Goals Plan (OPNAVINST 5300.6A), and to assure you of my assistance and that of the Human Resource Management Center Staff, and to request certain basic information about the USS Thunderbolt.

The purpose of the Navy's Human Goals Program is to ensure the development of the full potential of its human resources and application of that potential toward maximum effectiveness in the performance of the Navy's primary mission. As presently envisioned, the Human Resource Management Cycle consists of the following phases:

a. Preliminary Data Collection - Human Resource Management Center consultants will conduct a series of visits with you to make arrangements to conduct a survey and/or selected interviews, as deemed appropriate. After the survey/interviews have been conducted and interpreted, the consultants will present the data to you to assist in making preliminary plans for the most effective use of the five-day Human Resource Availability (HRAV) period in meeting your needs.

b. Five-Day Human Resource Availability Period - Human Resource Management Center consultants will be available to conduct workshops and other training, selected by you, with the end result being the development of a Command Action Plan.

c. Six-Month Follow-on Visit - A Human Resource Management Center consultant will be available to you to jointly review the initial Command Action Plan and determine whether or not further involvement is desired during the current year.

Exhibit 2

Commander A. C. Reagan heads the Human Resource Management Support Team that I have assigned to your command. His telephone numbers are 526-3756/8. Commander Reagan will work with you during the preliminary steps leading up to the HRAV upon your return to CONUS. Past experience with fleet units has demonstrated that a series of planning sessions between the HRM consultants and the unit Commanding Officer are highly desirable to ensure that the HRM program, and the HRAV in-particular, are properly tailored to meet the needs of the individual unit.

In order to conduct the Human Resource Availability week, I propose that the following schedule of events take place within the periods/weeks indicated. These dates are predicated around your return to CONUS and subsequent leave and up keep period.

12 - 18 May	Initial visit between you and Human Resources Management Center representative, CWO William Harris. Survey of your command.
18 - 22 June	Feedback of survey data
25 - 26 June	Planning of Human Resource Availability week
9 - 13 July	Human Resource Availability week

In order to familiarize the members of the team with the USS Thunderbolt and productively utilize the time available, I request you have available at the initial meeting some basic information which will be used in planning follow-on meetings:

- a. A copy of any current Command Action Plan and/or any Affirmative Action Plan.
- b. A list of any formal unit goals towards which you are currently striving.
- c. An organizational chart and the number of officers and enlisted personnel on board.
- d. A listing of personnel who have primary or collateral duties in Human Resource Management matters.
- e. In addition, include any information regarding the Command's detailed work schedule that would have an impact on the dedicated Human Resource Availability five-day period. In order to maximize both the individual program aspects and depth of cooperative planning necessary to ensure meeting the needs and desires of the USS Thunderbolt these schedules should be kept up-to-date.

If some of the information in this letter or request for information raises questions or concerns, please call either CDR Reagan or myself at 526-7613 or 526-2401 or come by Human Resource Management Center to see me. I would like to assure you that the information you give us will be used for planning purposes and will be held in strictest confidence by the members of my staff.

I want to assure you of my genuine interest in offering you a Human Resource Availability week which will truly meet your individual requirements as commanding officer.

Sincerely,

L. A. Percy
Captain, U. S. Navy

Copy to:

Squadron Commander

THE WHY, THE WHAT, AND THE HOW OF THE NAVY HUMAN GOALS PLAN

Exhibit 3

WHY A HUMAN GOALS PLAN?

The Navy Human Goals Plan is an outgrowth of laws passed by Congress, particularly the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, and the Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Act of 1970. These acts have been implemented in the Armed Services by Presidential Executive Order. Additionally, the All-Volunteer Force has generated pressures for improved utilization of our human and material resources while maintaining combat readiness.

WHAT IS THE HUMAN GOALS PLAN?

The Navy Human Goals Plan (OPNAVINST 5300.6A) is basically a leadership/management plan which consolidates human resource management programs initiated in 1970. It operates in parallel with the Defense Department Human Goals Credo. The DOD Credo is concerned with the recognition that the defense of the nation requires a well trained force of people and that the individual himself has inherent dignity and worth.

WHAT ARE THE PLANS OBJECTIVES?

The Plan is concerned with:


1. Informing people at all levels about the Human Goals Credo and its importance as a basic building block of Navy life.
2. The implementation of leadership and management improvement programs to achieve increased command excellence.
3. The achievement of equal opportunity.
4. Reemphasizing the important role of middle management in implementing policy and strengthening the chain of command. ●●
5. Ensuring that Navy units operate as a positive and effective instrument of overseas diplomacy.
6. The elimination of the abuse of alcohol and drugs through education and action programs.
7. Helping personnel leaving the service to readjust to civilian life.
8. Attracting and retaining quality personnel.

WHO WILL BE INVOLVED?

The operational forces including fleet support units through their assigned fleet commanders, the training establishment through the Chief of Naval Education and Training, and shore activities through their own individual commanders.

WHAT ARE THE EXPECTED RESULTS?

Achievement of the following results is expected through implementation of this plan.



DESIRED OUTCOMES OF THE HUMAN GOALS PROGRAM

1. Improved state of operational and material readiness.
2. Enhance the quality of personal two-way communications at all levels of the chain of command.
3. Improve the image of the Navy at home and abroad.
4. Develop improved leadership practices and more effective utilization of human, fiscal and material resources.
5. Provide a high degree of career satisfaction and thereby attract and retain quality personnel.
6. Strengthen the chain of command.
7. Development of a Human Goals Action Plan by all commands.
8. Effect Equal Opportunity through the increase of minorities horizontally and vertically throughout the Navy structure.
9. Advance Equal Opportunity through improved managerial capabilities of our majority population.
10. Create an increased understanding and acceptance of the host nation culture and customs and increase the level of favorable incidents and decrease adverse incidents among Navy personnel and dependents.
11. Increase the number of volunteers for overseas duty.
12. Improve the knowledge, understanding and appreciation for host nation language, customs and culture in order to increase opportunity to satisfy social, economic and recreational needs through the resources of the host nation.
13. Create an environment of understanding, cultural adjustment and satisfaction that will contribute to the reduction of foreign claims, legal action and unfavorable civil and labor activities against the U. S. government, Navy personnel and their dependents.
14. Increase the ability of all hands to recognize the symptoms and dangers of alcohol and drug abuse.
15. Ensure recognition of alcoholism as a treatable illness.
16. Modify conditions and peer pressures that tend to encourage drug and alcohol abuse.
17. Reduce the incidence of drug and alcohol abuse by military members and dependents to obtain lower treatment loads, ease lost time due to abuse and reduce other testing and control program costs.



HOW WILL THESE RESULTS BE OBTAINED?

The Human Goals Plan will implement the integration of Human Goals throughout the chain of command on a Navy-wide basis. Each individual unit both afloat and ashore will have responsibilities for practical training in and affirmative action toward improved utilization of its human resources. Direct assistance to unit commanders to improve human resource management within their organizations will be available through U. S. and overseas based Human Resource Management Centers and Detachments.

WHERE IS THE ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE?

Fleet commanders will schedule units under their control annually for a five (5) day human resource management availability period. During this period Human Resource Management Centers and Detachments will be available to provide assistance to the unit in the areas of Race Relations Education, Organizational Development and Management, Intercultural Relations and Drug and Alcohol Education. A Human Resource Management Center headquartered in Washington, D. C. will be available to provide Human Goals supporting services to the Shore Establishment.

The Chief of Naval Education and Training has been tasked to provide education in skill development and human resource management/leadership for all ranks and rates at key points throughout a Navy career.

Human Resource Management Centers are currently located at Norfolk, Virginia; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and San Diego, California.



NAVY HUMAN GOALS OBJECTIVES

1. Navy personnel are informed and understand the Human Goals Credo.
2. Implement leadership and management improvement programs to achieve increased command excellence through the most effective utilization of human and physical resources.
3. Ensure equal opportunity in the Navy.
4. Reemphasize the important role of middle management in implementing policy and strengthening the chain of command.
5. Ensure that Navy units operate as a positive and effective instrument of overseas diplomacy.
6. Eliminate abuse of drugs and alcohol in the Navy through education and action programs.
7. Assist Navy personnel leaving the service to readjust to civilian life.
8. Attract to and retain in the Navy people with ability, dedication, and capacity for growth.





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN GOALS

Our nation was founded on the principle that the individual has infinite dignity and worth. The Department of Defense, which exists to keep the Nation secure and at peace, must always be guided by this principle. In all that we do, we must show respect for the serviceman, the servicewoman and the civilian employee, recognizing their individual needs, aspirations and capabilities.

The defense of the Nation requires a well-trained force, military and civilian, regular and reserve. To provide such a force we must increase the attractiveness of a career in Defense so that the service member and the civilian employee will feel the highest pride in themselves and their work, in the uniform and the military profession.

THE ATTAINMENT OF THESE GOALS REQUIRES THAT WE STRIVE ...

To attract to the defense service people with ability, dedication, and capacity for growth;

To provide opportunity for every one, military and civilian, to rise to as high a level of responsibility as possible, dependent only on individual talent and diligence;

To make military and civilian service in the Department of Defense a model of equal opportunity for all regardless of race, sex, creed or national origin, and to hold those who do

business with the Department to full compliance with the policy of equal employment opportunity;

To help each service member in leaving the service to readjust to civilian life; and

To contribute to the improvement of our society, including its disadvantaged members, by greater utilization of our human and physical resources while maintaining full effectiveness in the performance of our primary mission.

James R. Holloman
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

H. P. Clement
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Thomas H. Miller
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Harold P. Callaway
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
John W. Warner
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

John L. McLucas
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

ORIGINAL TOBUD DATED
AUGUST 16, 1973

August W. Callaway
CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY


J. M. Brown
CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. NAVY

George J. Brown
CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

C. B. Gledhill
COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

19 October 1973 •



PERSONAL

To: All Flag Officers, Unit Commanders, Commanding Officers

You have all heard about the recently promulgated Navy Human Goals Plan. Because I feel this plan has a high degree of urgency, I have decided to devote this letter to this one subject.

Let me state at the outset, that even if there were not the obvious ethical imperatives for this plan, the change in environment we are undergoing with the all-volunteer armed forces concept would make its implementation one of enlightened self-interest.


Let me also say that I have no illusion of this or any other plans working without the support of the leadership of the Navy -- not just passive agreement but whole-hearted self-interested involvement.

These are not the tranquil times of earlier years; the problems are indeed real and no quick fix or public relation message is going to make them go away.

To even the casual observer it is obvious that conditions which obtained when you and I entered the Navy are shifting. Many of the tenets, assumptions, and customs of the last three decades which have formed the basis for Navy manning and management practices are undergoing great changes. Attitudes toward authority, toward the military, toward education, toward the value of openness, questioning, and candor all appear to be changing. Changes in these societal values have rendered meaningless a number of the customary management and leadership strategies which were in the past effective.

Before I say anything further, however, let me stress that our basic principle has not changed.

It is exactly what it has been and will continue to be; to provide responsive, effective combat capability for our Commander-in-Chief to use as needed.



And the principal yardstick by which we will measure this capability is also the same -- mission effectiveness.

What has changed is our functional environment. Not to recognize this is to beg the question and is farcical when viewed against the turmoil of recent years.

In place of a Navy whose ranks have been filled in part by "draft-motivated" enlistees there has been substituted the system of true all-volunteer attraction and recruitment. Under the all-volunteer system we must really compete with the other services and civilian society in the manpower market. Changes in values and preferences which have occurred in that portion of the population upon which we must draw have been sufficiently large that we must adapt our human resource management methods in order to attract, retain and effectively utilize our manpower.

To compete effectively in the manpower market with other types of employment, naval service must provide work roles which are satisfying activities in their own right, and which are seen as making a positive contribution both to the organization and the individual.

One Commanding Officer recently told me that 80% (160) of his E-5 and below did not enlist for what the Navy had to offer, but for what civilian society did not or could not provide.

If we know this, why then can we not approach human resource management as we do other systemic problems? In spite of the ostensible priority given to people as our most important and expensive asset, human resource management has lagged behind our systems approaches to money and material management.

Sailor motivation is becoming an increasingly difficult problem. There is considerable evidence that people coming into the Navy today are different from those of the past with respect to their attitudes. They seem less conscientious, have less respect for formal authority, show little concern for job security, and are more inclined to want to have some say about what they do and how they do it. As I have indicated, these differences in attitudes are due in large part to cultural changes in society. To maintain unit



effectiveness at our traditionally high levels in this environment, it is an absolute necessity that we develop the full potential of our people and apply that potential toward achieving across the board command excellence.

With the implementation of the Human Goals Plan, we have launched a dynamic and responsive set of programs, soundly based on knowledge gained through experience, research and analysis, and designed to develop and more effectively utilize human resources to achieve command excellence.

Our Human Resource Management Program focuses on motivation within a command. In essence I view it as a systematic approach to building good order and discipline, responsibility, authority and accountability, pride and professionalism, morale and esprit, and teamwork. In the sense that it seeks these goals, it is essentially a leadership plan, focusing on what the Navy has traditionally deemed as having high priority in the fields of leadership and management. Recognizing that long-term effectiveness is directly proportional to the amount of individual satisfaction gained through contributing to organizational objectives, its general goal is to improve organizational effectiveness by increasing motivation.

The major premise of the plan is that the human system of an organization can be approached in a logical, rational manner. That is, that scientific technology can be applied in leadership and personnel management as it has been in other areas of management. It can be readily seen that the basic Human Resource Management objectives contained in the plan are nothing new for the Navy. Although the words may be different from those to which we are accustomed, we have always sought these conditions and good leaders have achieved them. What is new is that the Human Resource Management Program is a systematic, planned approach to increasing organizational efficiency with the focus on leadership development and the human portion of an organization.

As society has changed the expectations of our young sailors, so must we change our leadership and management strategies to satisfy their expectations while achieving our missions. Once we have achieved these basic goals, only then can we expect improved unit readiness, improved career and job satisfaction, improved morale and esprit, improved retention rates



as well as the various other expected results outlined in the Human Goals Plan.

The plan was developed on the assumption that we will continue to function in an all-volunteer environment. We must compete in the market place to obtain the necessary quantity of young men and women to fill our ranks. Once this has been accomplished we must develop and retain a well disciplined, professional Navy. How do we go about this task? A great deal of controversy has been generated over this question, but there is no doubt in any one's mind that highly motivated sailors are essential to an effective fighting Navy.

Our goal is to provide leadership and management techniques and procedures to develop, maintain, and improve motivation and commitment to the Navy. Obviously the first step is to manifest to our people our dedication to provide an organization (ship, squadron, station, unit, division, department, etc.) which preserves individual dignity, fosters individual development, secures personal satisfaction and satisfies an individual's desire to belong to a winning team. I know of a first-rate attack squadron that by providing these things to its people achieved a first term reenlistment rate of 78% over the past 18 months. Its sailors simply did not want to be traded to another team or play out their options elsewhere. Once we have provided these same things Navy-wide, our professional sailor will commit himself to his organization, its rules, goals and its leaders.

From the outset I have assumed that traditional principles of leadership and management employed by the Navy are basically sound. On the other hand, the idea that nothing new can be added to improve our techniques and procedures is unimaginative. Few will deny that leadership is the most critical element in producing a highly motivated professional Navy. But to say that "All we need is good leadership" is to beg the question. We must determine how to get that "good leadership" Navy-wide. Also, there is more to the problem than just good leadership.

As we know, motivation is a product of many factors -- some personal, others environmental. In general, each individual is motivated to achieve his personal goals, which are some combination of economic gain, security, esteem, and a sense of accomplishment and belonging. To gain the commitment of the sailor to the Navy, the Navy must satisfy

some of these needs. At the same time, the goals of the Navy -- good order and discipline, well-trained sailors who work as a team, mission effectiveness -- must be achieved.

I believe we can attract the proper men and women, and that the requisite technical training can be imparted to them. The remaining challenge is the development of the professional competence of this asset and the full and effective use of that competence to achieve Navy goals. This challenge can only be achieved by the sustained application of the finest leadership and managerial skills. This is our highest priority. An all-volunteer force in a zero draft environment requires nothing less. Our officers and petty officers are experiencing new demands for firmness; for the understanding of human motivations; for sensitivity to the methods of securing human responses; and for skills in supplying human satisfactions.

The Human Goals Plan is an integrated, systematic application of the finest techniques developed from the people-oriented pilot projects conducted over the past few years. It is designed to attack head-on the leadership problems confronting our Navy in today's world. I view it as a dynamic and responsive plan for instilling leadership in the Navy and for developing and utilizing human resources.

To say again and again that we need better leadership and management, that we now have a plan for achieving it, and that we are implementing the plan is not enough. Leadership is intangible, hard to measure and difficult to describe. Its qualities stem from many factors. Certainly they must include a measure of inherent ability to control and direct, self-confidence based on expert knowledge, initiative, loyalty, pride and a sense of responsibility. Inherent ability obviously cannot be instilled, but that which is latent or dormant can be developed. Other ingredients can be acquired. But leaders can be and are made. Whether or not they become great leaders depends on whether or not they possess that extra quality which makes the difference between the average man and the above average man. In our focus on leadership we must not only concentrate on improving organizational effectiveness, but we must also stress better assessment and development of our officers and petty officers.

To this end, our revised reports of officer fitness and petty officer evaluations will provide us with a better instrument for measuring leadership and management ability. They are longer and more complex than the previous forms but are more meaningful in terms of the skills required to successfully meet the leadership challenges of today. They are closely correlated to the leadership and management concepts developed in the Human Goals Plan. The data contained in reports will be more pertinent to preserving records of accomplishment and reward and hence to selection and placement processes. They will also be more relevant to the individual in assisting him to develop as a leader and to better manage his own career in consonance with his own abilities and interests.

Let me make one final point in closing. Many of you are already aware that our personnel as well as our hardware programs are coming under increasing attack.

Well publicized shiftings of national priorities have resulted in increased scrutiny of how we spend our monies. Now we find ourselves criticized not only for hardware costs but for personnel costs.

More than that there is a developing consensus that the way to attack us is not through hardware, but through personnel under the quite correct theory that if we don't have sailors we won't sail ships; and if we don't sail ships our hardware positions become much harder to defend.

These developments do not suggest easy sailing for our programs in the mid and late seventies. They do, however, serve to alert us to the need for insuring that our internal houses are in order in the ways in which we utilize our assets.

Our Human Goals Programs will be examined for the slightest hint that we are implementing these programs in a desultory or public relations motivated way. Should evidence be found that this is the case then another wedge will be driven between us and American young people from whom we recruit, and between our requests and what Congress is moved to provide.

Again even if we do not consider our ethical obligations in this matter -- obligations we do

of course consider -- our ability to maintain mission effectiveness is inexorably tied to our getting behind the Human Goals Programs.

We simply are not in the position any longer where we fail to recruit a young man or woman because of our inability to offer a meaningful disciplined challenge; or once having recruited him to lose him after training for the same reason; or to be doing less than our best in the face of Congressional, press and citizen's group criticism. In the next few years, perhaps more than anytime since the Louis Johnson Secretariat, we are truly running in harm's way. Our commitment -- beginning with the flag officer at the top -- must be impeccable if we are to come through remaining mission effective.

We are in a new era. We must clearly think through what might happen should we fail to meet the challenges this new era offers.

*I inspect the force, team spirit to put us
over the top*

Bud Zumwalt
E. R. ZUMWALT, JR.
Admiral, U.S. Navy





Exhibit 6

THE OFFICER PERSONNEL Newsletter

OFFICER DISTRIBUTION DIVISION

BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20370

18, No. 2

December 1973 •

(NAVPERS-15392)

FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

The basis for the Navy's Human Goals Plan derives from requirements levied on the military establishment by Congress. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the Equal Opportunity Act and the Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Act have all been implemented in the armed forces by executive order. Superimposed upon all of these mandates is the very real fact that with the AVF a reality there are limited fiscal and human resources available to accomplish our primary mission of maintaining an effective combat capability. There can be little doubt that we must tap the full potential of our human resources and apply that potential toward maximizing mission effectiveness.

For the foreseeable future, the Navy is committed to a smaller, more effective force—a force which must be volunteer and which must perform professionally in a complex, technical environment. There is a very real economic necessity to meet that commitment at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer.

The Secretary of Defense recently reissued the DOD Human Goals Credo. When we examine that document closely, we find it formally recognizes that the defense of the nation requires a well trained force and that to provide such a force, we must increase the attractiveness of a career so that our service men and women will feel the highest pride in themselves, in their work, their uniform, and in the military profession. It also recognizes that the individual has infinite dignity and worth.

To attain these goals, the credo requires that we strive to attract and retain good people; that we fulfill their aspirations for advancement, promotion, and job satisfaction; that we provide true equal opportunity for all; that we help in leaving the naval service to adjust to civilian life; and finally that we better utilize our human resources in the performance of our primary mission. These are leadership responsibilities.

In parallel with those DOD goals are the Navy's own human goals objectives: enforcement of good order and discipline in a changing social environment, the creation of a climate within the Navy in which there is an absence of discrimination, full involvement of middle management in chain-of-command responsibilities, improvement of professionalism and performance, and efficient human and fiscal resource management. Here again, we see a requirement for good and enlightened leadership.

The Navy Human Goals Plan, then, is essentially a leadership/management plan which extends and directs the human resource action programs which began in 1970. It consolidates all such programs and actions into one effort within the establishment for implementation through the chain of command. It incorporates recommendations received from fleet commanders-in-chief over the past year, and it will enable the Human Resource Development Project to be established as a Project Office by 1 July 1974. This plan provides for the development of individual leadership/management skills through education and training, and it also provides direct assistance to unit commanders to improve resource management within their organizations.

Under this plan, every Navy unit afloat and ashore is assigned specific responsibilities for practical training and creative action to improve the productivity of our people. The plan stresses fundamental principles: those first principles of the Navy—leadership and professionalism—responsibility, authority, and accountability; good order and discipline; morale and esprit; and pride in uniform.

To meet these objectives, we have developed programs in five major categories that comprise the Navy Human Goals

1. Human Resource Management consisting of:

- Leadership and Organizational Development and Management
- Intercultural Relations.



Race Relations, and Drug and Alcohol Education

2. Equal Opportunity
3. Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control
4. Career Motivation
5. TRANSITION/Second Career Planning and Assistance

Under this plan Human Resource Management Centers (HRMC) and Detachments (HRMD) will be established at population centers throughout the world. The appropriate fleet commander-in-chief will exercise operational control over these facilities, which will provide assistance, on a continuing basis, to all operating forces in their efforts to achieve the-board excellence.


The concept of employing dedicated periods of time in the operating schedule will be the method of providing this training assistance to improve unit effectiveness. These periods will spread over a unit's normal operating schedule and include:

1. An initial survey conducted by HRMC personnel. During this survey, CO and Type Commander requirements would be discussed and the consultants and CO would establish objectives and a command action plan.
2. About five weeks subsequent to the survey, a 5-day period will commence with the command and staffs reviewing previous problem areas and existing plans, conducting workshops, and carrying out the command action plan.
3. A follow-on visit, six months later, will judge progress made and determine additional assistance necessary. Further dedicated periods will then be scheduled as necessary.

A Human Resource Management Team (HRMT) will be established in Washington, D.C. to provide a similar assistance service to second echelon commands at the headquarters level.

The Chief of Naval Training will provide training and education in skill development and in human resource management and leadership for all ranks and rates at entry and key career progression points. I will continue to operate the Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Centers to provide intensive resident care for personnel whose rehabilitation needs exceed the capabilities of local commands and/or Counseling and Assistance Centers (CAACS). Career motivation programs, as well as the Navy's efforts to help its members in their return to civilian life, will also remain under my review.

The all-volunteer environment is a reality. In it we are competing with the civilian community and other services for a limited manpower pool. Of all the military services, we are the only one which asks a major portion of our people to go away for extended periods on unaccompanied tours. We must, of course, train these people to perform effectively in a complex technical environment; but technical training alone will not insure unity of spirit and purpose, productivity, quality of opportunity, good order and discipline, or job satisfaction. Nor will it insure that our Navy men and women exist in sufficient numbers to maintain an all volunteer force. I solicit your support of the concept and objectives of the Navy Human Goals Plan to provide the essential additional ingredient. The challenges we all face today and in the future are nothing less.



DAVID H. BAGLEY
VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. Navy

THE OFFICER PERSONNEL NEWSLETTER (NAVPERS 15892)

Published quarterly in Washington, D.C., by the Bureau of Naval Personnel (Officer Distribution Division). The Newsletter consists of a series of timely articles concerning the career development, education, and assignment of Navy Officers. Its purpose is to amplify and explain personnel policies or procedures as required to promote better understanding. Issuance of NAVPERS 15892 is approved in accordance with Department of the Navy Publications and Printing Regulations, NAVENOS P-35. Inquiries concerning the Officer Personnel Newsletter should be addressed to: Chief of Naval Personnel (Pers-171), Navy Department, Washington, D.C. 20370.

Exhibit 7

TTUZYUW RHHRBR3563 0012232-UUUU--RHHRN6A.

NR DUUUU

012231Z/003 JAN 74

ALPACFLT 3/74

PRAC DECK 90

C#107

N CINCPACFLT MAKALAPA HI

O ALPACFLT

NFO RHEBJFA/CHNAVPER5 WASHINGTON DC

Y
NCLAS 7/0053007/N7

LPACFLT 003/74

INCPACFLTNOTE 5566 - HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

OPNAVINST 5500.6 (NAVY HUMAN GOALS PLAN).

REFERENCE A PROMULGATED THE NAVY HUMAN GOALS PLAN. THE PURPOSE OF THE PLAN IS TO PROVIDE A PROGRAM QUOTE: TO ENSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FULL POTENTIAL OF THE NAVY'S HUMAN RESOURCES AND APPLICATION OF THAT POTENTIAL TOWARD MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NAVY'S PRIMARY MISSION. UNQUOTE. THE NAVY HUMAN GOALS PLAN IS FURTHER DESIGNED TO PROMOTE SOUND LEADERSHIP, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE, RESPONSIBILITY, AUTHORITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY, PRIDE AND PROFESSIONALISM, MORALE AND SPIRIT AND INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY AND WORTH WITHIN ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND.

THE NAVY HUMAN GOALS PLAN INCORPORATES A HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (HRM) PROGRAM WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE CONSULTANT AGE 32 RHHRBR3563 UNCLAS

SERVICES AND MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO COMMAND. THE NAVY HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ELEMENTS CONSIST OF:

- A. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT.
- B. RACE RELATIONS EDUCATION.
- C. DRUG ABUSE EDUCATION AND CONTROL.
- D. ALCOHOL ABUSE EDUCATION AND CONTROL.
- E. INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS.

IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE FOREGOING HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ELEMENTS, INDIVIDUAL UNITS WILL BE SCHEDULED (ULTIMATELY ON AN ANNUAL BASIS) FOR A CONCENTRATED FIVE DAY HRM PERIOD IN WHICH CONSULTANT SERVICES WILL BE PROVIDED IN THE CONDUCT, PLANNING AND/OR DEVELOPMENT OF:

- A. COMMAND HRM PROGRAMS AND OBJECTIVES.
- B. COMMAND HRM ACTION PLANS.

ADDITIONALLY THERE WILL BE SEMINARS AVAILABLE FOR ALL ECHELONS WITHIN THE COMMAND ENCOMPASSING THE GENERAL TOPICS OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS, PLANNING AND GOAL SETTING, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY, AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE EDUCATION. DETAILS OF SCHEDULING AND THE CONDUCT OF AGE 03 RHHRBR3563 UNCLAS

A WEEK WILL BE PROMULGATED IN A FORTHCOMING CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION.

CINCPACFLT'S PRINCIPAL AGENTS IN PROVIDING CONSULTANT SERVICES TO ALL ECHELONS OF COMMANDS IN THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS ARE THE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

CENTERS AT PEARL HARBOR AND SAN DIEGO. AS OF 1 JANUARY 1974 THESE CENTERS BECAME THIRD ECHELON COMMANDS UNDER CINCPACFLT. THE CENTERS WILL PROVIDE CONSULTANT SERVICES NECESSARY FOR SUPPORTING THE NAVY HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM WITHIN THE PACIFIC FLEET. FINALLY, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DETACHMENTS WILL BE CREATED IN AN, SUBIC AND YOKOSUKA TO SUPPORT THE NAVY HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR CINCPACFLT COMMANDS AND TENANT ACTIVITIES IN SIPAC.

EACH HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CENTER IS PRESENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF COMPLETING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEVERAL HRM TEAMS OF SKILLED CONSULTANTS WHICH WILL ASSIST COMMAND IN THE IMPLEMENTATION AND FINE TUNING OF THE COMMAND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM. EACH OF THESE TEAMS WILL HAVE ASSIGNED TO IT OFFICER AND ENLISTED SPECIALISTS WHO HAVE EXPERTISE IN ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT, RACE RELATIONS EDUCATION, DRUG EDUCATION, ALCOHOL EDUCATION, AND INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS.

SE 04 RHMMRAB563 UNCLAS

INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS ALPACFLT WILL BE PROMULGATED IN FUTURE CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION.

163

IN

02208/JAN-01

/ACK

#2 2 of 2

C/S 01 02/03 04 ADJ PERS


NAVPERC 03A INSP EA COMPT

HRSP CPO RTR HRS

XNIG 002 X1/AN3 HRI GENMAG

2-27-74 02012

Exhibit 8



U. S. NAVY HUMAN GOALS PLAN

I. CONCEPT

The U.S. Navy's Human Goals Plan extends and directs the Navy's Personal Affairs Action Programs of 1970. It incorporates selected plans and programs designed to meet Chief of Naval Operation Objectives and provides direction for Navy-wide activity in support of the Department of Defense Human Goals Credo. The plan and its implementation are designed to integrate Human Goals programs completely throughout the chain of command.

The purpose of the Navy's Human Goals Program is to ensure the development of the full potential of its human resources and application of that potential toward maximum effectiveness in the performance of the Navy's primary mission. The Navy recognizes that to fulfill this purpose its Human Goals Programs must promote sound leadership, good order and discipline, responsibility, authority and accountability, pride and professionalism, morale and esprit, and individual dignity and worth. Accepting these principles as an integral part of the Navy's conduct of its normal affairs, this plan schedules the identification, development, integration, implementation, resource requirements, and evaluation which are necessary to integrate the existing Human Goals programs into the naval establishment. The programs which comprise the Navy's Human Goals Plan are organized into five major categories:

1. Human Resource Management consisting of:

- . Organizational Development and Management
- . Intercultural Relations
- . Race Relations, and
- . Drug and Alcohol Education

✓ 2. Equal Opportunity

✓ 3. Drug Abuse Control and Alcoholism Prevention

✓ 4. Career Motivation :

✓ 5. TRANSITION/Second Career Planning and Assistance

This plan assigns responsibilities for program development, information promulgation, and training and application of the Navy's Human Goals programs to every Navy unit afloat and ashore, in order to insure that all Navy men and women are fully informed of the Human Goals Credo of the Department of Defense and also to insure that high standards are achieved and maintained in the employment of the Navy's human resources. The near-term aim is to have all the Human Goals programs so well integrated into the system that these requirements can be managed not only by the highest levels of Navy leadership, but also by the petty officers and the division officers of today and the future.

(R)

II. DISCUSSION

Out of the turbulence and tumultuous change generated by the conflicting human forces besetting our society during the past two decades, there emerged an increased awareness of the unique worth of the individual as he interacts with and is influenced by the institutions of his society. The Navy, which at once protects and reflects the considered values of our society, has been no less invulnerable to the impact of the forces of change. Nor, has it been less sensitive to the need for providing enlightened leadership in the harnessing of the beneficial aspects of these changes as they impact on the Naval establishment. The Navy Human Goals Plan is a reflection of the Navy's concern for the felt needs of its members.

The Plan may be viewed, retrospectively, as having progressed through three stages and as now being embarked upon a fourth. These overlapping stages and their commencement dates can be identified as Initiation: 1964; Development: 1968; Refinement and Application: February 1971; and Program Integration: March 1973. The fifth phase, Operations and Maintenance, is to become, by 1 July 1974, the responsibility of Operational Force and Shore Establishment Commanders supported by the Naval Training Command.

The Navy Human Goals Plan directs a family of mutually supportive programs concerned with improving human resource utilization to achieve maximum mission effectiveness. These programs, Equal Opportunity, Human Resource Management, Drug Abuse Control and Alcoholism Prevention, and Career Motivation, are outlined in detail in TABS A-F of the Navy Human Goals Plan, as is a discussion of Personnel, Training and Manpower Research.

These programs did not all begin at the same time nor did they develop at the same pace. Significant events in the growth of the individual programs since 1964 are summarized in TABLE II-1.

A. Navy Human Goals Objectives: Consistent with the Department of Defense Human Goals Credo (FIGURE II-1) and the development of more effective human resource utilization, the Navy is committed to the following Human Goals Objectives:

- (1) To insure that the personnel of the Navy at every level of command are informed and understand the Human Goals Credo and its importance as a basic tenet of Navy life;
- (2) To implement leadership and management improvement programs at every level in the chain of command to achieve increased command excellence through the most effective utilization of human and physical resources;
- (3) To ensure equal opportunity in the Navy by making prejudice of any kind an unacceptable practice and to identify and eliminate individual and institutional racism;

13 December 1973

4. To reemphasize the important role of middle management in implementing policy and in giving strength to the chain of command;

5. To ensure that Navy units operate as a positive and effective instrument of overseas diplomacy and that individual Navy personnel and their families live and work productively and with satisfaction in an overseas environment;

6. To eliminate the abuse of drugs and alcohol in the Navy through education and action programs;

7. To help all Navy personnel leaving the service to readjust to civilian life;

8. To attract to and retain in the Navy people with ability, dedication, and the capacity for growth.

B. Program Impact to Date: The following results have been achieved by the various programs during the development phase of the Navy's Human Goals Plan:

1. Equal Opportunity and Race Relations Education: The Navy's Race Relations Education Program will have completed formal, initial training classes for every flag officer in the Navy by 1 July 1973, and for 125,000 E-5 thru O-6 personnel by 30 September 1973. Many of the Executive and Flag Seminar attendees initiated excellent equal opportunity affirmative action plans for their respective commands subsequent to completion of the seminars. No such plans existed a year ago.

2. Human Resource Management Program: The Human Resource Management Program provides consultant services and management and leadership development assistance to commands Navy-wide. In the past two years, this program has been developed, tested, and implemented through four major field activities. Management and leadership seminars have been attended by 1600 military personnel, and 70 separate commands have utilized HRMCs to assist them in achieving command excellence through improved human resource management.

3. Intercultural Relations: The Navy's ICR program has initiated training of all naval personnel ashore and afloat in La Maddalena and Roosevelt Roads. Similar training is currently being conducted in Naples, Athens, Keflavik, and Rota, Spain. Post arrival ICR training for naval personnel and their families will commence in Japan, Guam, and the Philippines during the summer of 1973. Area orientation briefings will have been conducted for 75,000 personnel in deploying units during FY-72 and FY-73. All high impact personnel (Personnel Exchange Program, Overseas Staff, Civic Action Teams, Military Assistance Advisory Group, PCO/PXO's of overseas commands, midshipmen on exchange) attend a three week Intercultural Relations Training course at NAVPHIBSCOL, Coronado.

4. Drug Abuse Education: As of 30 June 1973, twenty five hundred Drug Abuse Kits consisting of advanced audio-visual training aids have been distributed to commands Navy-wide. Additionally, the two day training required for optimum utilization of the Drug Abuse Kit will have been given to over 5,000 individuals, including commanders at each of the commands receiving the kit. Two hundred and fifty Drug Abuse Education Specialists (DAES) have completed training and, in conjunction with drug education consultants from the Human Resource Management Centers, are actively engaged in providing effective support for fleet commands throughout the world.

5. Drug Abuse Control: The cost of establishing and maintaining the Navy Counseling and Assistance Centers (CAACs), formerly CARE Centers, and the Navy's Drug Rehabilitation Centers (NDRCs), for the first 8 months of FY-73 was 4.4 million dollars. During this period, 1889 individuals have been returned to effective fleet duty. This represents a cost avoidance to the Navy of 2 million dollars. Prior to the establishment of the Centers, 70% of Navy personnel with drug abuse problems were administratively discharged. During FY-73, with the establishment of the centers, 75% of personnel with drug abuse problems have been counseled effectively and retained on duty throughout the Navy.

6. Alcoholism Prevention Program: The cost of establishing and maintaining the Navy's Alcohol Rehabilitation Centers (ARCs) and Alcohol Rehabilitation Units (ARUs) for the first 8 months of FY-73 was 3.2 million dollars. During this period, 665 individuals have been returned to effective fleet duty. This represents a cost avoidance, in personnel replacement costs, of 7 million dollars, resulting in a net savings to the Navy of 3.8 million dollars.

7. TRANSITION/Second Career Planning Assistance Program: Since the beginning of the TRANSITION Program in 1968, over 400 of those counseled each year have made the decision to remain in the Navy after evaluating the civilian alternatives available. These personnel were all qualified for reenlistment. The replacement cost to recruit and train 400 personnel averages 4.4 million dollars a year. Therefore, the TRANSITION Program has resulted in net cost avoidance for the Navy of 3.5 million dollars a year, as well as meeting the program objectives of easing transition to civilian life. Over 306,000 personnel have availed themselves of this service since program inception.

C. Expected Results: Specific outcomes anticipated through implementation of this plan are listed below. Many are presently being achieved in some degree through existing programs and routine operational/administrative practices. However, this plan will provide further impetus, integrate and thereby improve the results of the existing, related efforts. (R

The outcomes listed are directly related to one or more of the Navy's Human Goals set forth on page II-1. The criteria used in selecting them were that they had to be:

- . Easily recognized as having a logical connection to the Navy's Human Goals.
- . Realistically achievable within the existing command and organizational structure, and current resource capabilities of the Navy.
- . Applicable to the entire Navy.

Attainment of the Navy Human Goals objectives will:

Result in an improved state of operational and material readiness with an attendant higher state of unit and individual training.

Create an atmosphere which will enhance the quality of personal two-way communications at all levels in the chain of command.

Improve the image of the Navy at home and abroad as a professional organization which recognizes the personal worth and dignity of the individual and his family.

Develop improved leadership practices at all levels resulting in significant dollar savings due to the more effective utilization of human, fiscal, and material resources.

Provide a high degree of career satisfaction for the individual Navy person and family and thereby attract and retain quality personnel in numbers sufficient to support present and future Navy personnel requirements.

Strengthen the Navy chain of command which will demonstrate a high degree of pride and professionalism, personal authority and respect, individual responsibility, equal opportunity, and a reduced level of disciplinary problems.

Result in the development of a Human Goals Action Plan by all commands.

Effect equal opportunity through the steadily observable increase of minorities horizontally and vertically throughout the entire Navy structure.

13 December 1973

Advance equal opportunity through the improved managerial capabilities of our majority population to apply with equity the rewards and punishments within the system accompanied by reductions in discrimination complaints, racial incidents and related infractions of the UCMJ. (A

Create an increased understanding and acceptance of the host nation culture and customs that will promote an increased level of favorable incidents and decreased adverse incidents among Navy personnel, their dependents and host nationals.

Increase the number of volunteers for overseas duty supported by an improved screening and selection process resulting in more effective personnel assignment actions and significant dollar savings.

Improve the knowledge, understanding and appreciation for host nation language, customs and culture, and availability of goods and services resulting in increased opportunities to satisfy social, economic and recreational needs through the resources of the host nation with a consequent reduction in the dependence upon U. S. support facilities.

Create an environment of understanding, cultural adjustment, and satisfaction that will contribute to the reduction of foreign claims, legal action, and unfavorable civil and labor activities against the U. S. Government, Navy personnel and their dependents.

Increase the ability of all hands to recognize the symptoms and dangers of alcohol and drug abuse which lead to reduced performance, disciplinary infractions, health and family problems, accidents, injuries, and death.

Ensure recognition of alcoholism as an illness, treatable without stigma, and promote the acceptance and meaningful employment of successfully rehabilitated personnel as effective members of the Navy community.

Modify those traditions, working and living conditions, and peer pressures that tend to encourage drug and alcohol abuse and that stigmatize individuals who choose to abstain.

Reduce the incidence of drug and alcohol abuse by military members and dependents to obtain lower treatment loads, ease lost time due to abuse, and a reduction in urinalysis testing and other drug and alcohol control program costs.

Exhibit 10
INSTRUCTIONS

1. All questions can be answered by filling in appropriate answer spaces on the answer sheet. If you do not find the exact answer that fits your case, use the one that is closest to it.
2. Please answer all questions.
3. Remember, the value of the survey depends upon your being straightforward in answering this questionnaire. You will not be identified with your answers.
4. The answer sheet is designed for automatic scanning of your responses. Questions are answered by marking the appropriate answer spaces (circles) on the answer sheet, as illustrated in this example:

Q. Which is the only marking instrument that will be read properly?

Ballpoint pen	Fountain pen	Soft lead pencil	Other
①	②	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	④

↑
ANSWER

5. Please use a **soft pencil**, and observe carefully these important requirements:
 - Make heavy black marks that fill the circles.
 - Erase cleanly any answer you wish to change.
 - Make no stray markings of any kind.
6. Questions about "your command" refer to the ship, squadron, or similar operational unit to which you are assigned. Questions about "your supervisor" refer to the person to whom you report directly. Questions about "your work group" refer to all those persons who report to the same supervisor as you do.

1. How friendly and easy to approach is your supervisor?
2. When you talk with your supervisor, to what extent does he pay attention to what you are saying?
3. To what extent is your supervisor willing to listen to your problems?
4. To what extent does this command have a real interest in the welfare and morale of assigned personnel?
5. My supervisor makes it easy to tell him when things are not going as well as he expects?
6. To what extent do you feel supported by your supervisor?
7. To what extent does your supervisor encourage the people who work for him to work as a team?
8. To what extent does your supervisor encourage the people who work for him to exchange opinions and ideas?
9. To what extent does your supervisor encourage people to give their best effort?
10. To what extent does your supervisor maintain high personal standards of performance?
11. To what extent are work activities sensibly organized in this command?
12. To what extent does this command have clear-cut, reasonable goals and objectives that contribute to its mission?
13. I feel that the workload and time factors are adequately considered in planning our work group assignments.
14. To what extent does your supervisor help you to improve your performance?
15. To what extent does your supervisor provide you with the help you need so you can schedule work ahead of time?

16. To what extent does your supervisor offer new ideas for solving job related problems?
17. To what extent does your supervisor attempt to work out disagreements?
18. How friendly and easy to approach are the members of your work group?
19. When you talk with the members in your work group, to what extent do they pay attention to what you are saying?
20. To what extent are the members in your work group willing to listen to your problems?
21. How much do members of your work group encourage each other to work as a team?
22. How much do members in your work group emphasize a team goal?
23. To what extent does your work group plan together and coordinate its efforts?
24. To what extent do you have confidence and trust in the members of your work group?
25. To what extent do you see your job as important and essential to your work group?
26. The output of our work group is essential to our command.
27. How much do people in your work group encourage each other to give their best effort?
28. To what extent do people in your work group maintain high standards of performance?

In general, how much say or influence does each of the following groups of people have on what goes on in your work group?

29. Lowest-level supervisors (Supervisors of non-supervisory personnel).
30. Non-supervisory personnel.

31. To what extent do members in your work group help you find ways to improve your performance?
32. To what extent do members of your work group provide the help you need so you can plan, organize and schedule work ahead of time?
33. To what extent do members of your work group offer each other new ideas for solving job related problems?
34. Members of my work group take the responsibility for resolving disagreements and working out acceptable solutions.
35. The members of my work group reflect Navy standards of military courtesy, appearance and grooming.
36. I feel that Navy standards of order and discipline are maintained within my work group.
37. How adequate for your needs is the amount of information you get about what is going on in other departments or watch sections?
38. To what extent are you told what you need to know to do your job in the best possible way?
39. How receptive are those above you to your ideas and suggestions?
40. To what extent do people in your work group exchange opinions and ideas?
41. People at higher levels of the command are aware of the problems and needs at my level.
42. To what extent is information about important events and situations put out within your work group?
43. In this command to what extent are the decisions made at those levels where the most adequate and accurate information is available.
44. Information is widely shared in this command so that those who make decisions have access to all available know-how?
45. Does your supervisor try to get your ideas before making decisions that are important to you?

46. To what extent does your work group make good decisions and solve problems well?
47. To what extent do you feel motivated to contribute your best efforts to the command's mission and tasks?
48. To what extent do you regard your duties in this command as enhancing your career?
49. Work group members who contribute the most are rewarded the most.
50. Our supervisor gives our work group credit for good work.
51. The morale and pride of the men in my work group is high.
52. To what extent is your command effective in getting you to meet its needs and contribute to its effectiveness?
53. To what extent does your command do a good job of meeting your needs as an individual?
54. To what extent has your work group been adequately trained to handle emergency situations?
55. I have been adequately trained to perform my assigned tasks.
56. My command encourages training for personal and professional growth.
57. My work group performs well under pressure or in emergency situations.
58. My work group has a good attitude toward training.
59. My work group can meet day to day mission requirements well.
60. My work group is combat ready.

61. Do you have a good understanding of your personal role as a representative of the U.S. when overseas?
62. Do members of your work group care about the image they project when ashore?
63. Do you consider the effect of your behavior on how people of this area view Navy personnel?
64. To what extent do you expect to be fairly dealt with while spending money in this area?
65. Do members of your work group look forward to visiting foreign countries?
66. To what extent do you believe you have sufficient understanding of the people and customs of this area to get along in this community?
67. To what extent has information been provided to assist you and/or your family to adjust to living in this area?
68. In my chain of command there is a willingness to confront racial problems in a positive manner.
69. I feel free to talk to my supervisor about racial problems in my work group.
70. Racial tensions interfere with the efficiency of my work group.
71. To what extent is your supervisor considerate in avoiding the use of inflammatory remarks about minorities?
72. Race Relations Education Training has been provided to members of my command.
73. I am familiar with my command's Equal Opportunity Affirmative Action Plan.

To what extent does your command ensure that you have equal opportunity for:

74. Off base housing.
75. Advancement in rate/rank.

To what extent does your command ensure that you have equal opportunity for:

- 76. Job assignment.
- 77. Education and training.
- 78. Evaluation.
- 79. Recreation.
- 80. To what extent is military justice administered fairly throughout your command?
- 81. To what extent would you feel free to tell your supervisor about a drug problem in your work group?
- 82. The use of drugs by some members of my work group hurts the work effort.
- 83. Do you feel that you understand the factors contributing to the abuse of drugs?
- 84. My supervisor is effective in helping work group members with drug problems.
- 85. To what extent do members of your work group discourage the use of drugs?
- 86. To what extent would you feel free to talk to your supervisor about an alcohol problem in your work group?
- 87. I can recognize the symptoms of alcoholism.
- 88. My supervisor is willing to confront alcohol problems that involve members of my work group.
- 89. Alcohol abuse by some members hurts the effort of my work group.
- 90. There is pressure within my work group to drink alcoholic beverages.

91. Alcoholism is recognized as a treatable illness by my command.
92. To what extent have you been made aware of the career opportunities open to you in the Navy?
93. To what extent does this command have an effective career counselling program?
94. How much difficulty did you have in finding housing in this area?
95. Do you feel pride and enhancement of your self-worth from the kind of work to which you are assigned?
96. The members of my work group are proud of the appearance and condition of our equipment and spaces.
97. Administrative practices (such as watch and duty assignments, special request chits, etc.,) that affect people in my work group are handled fairly.
98. All in all, how satisfied are you with the people in your work group?
99. All in all, how satisfied are you with your supervisor?
100. All in all, how satisfied are you with your job?
101. All in all, how satisfied are you with this command, compared to most others?
102. All in all, how satisfied do you feel with the progress you have made in the NAVY, up to now?
103. How satisfied do you feel with your chance for getting ahead in the Navy in the future?

EXHIBIT 11
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SURVEY

EXTENSION/INDEX

DEFINITION

COMMAND CLIMATE

COMMUNICATIONS FLOW Command leadership understands the work and problems of the Command. Information flows freely through the chain of command, easily from the work groups to listening and responsive leadership and easily to the work groups concerning plans and problems facing the command.

DECISION MAKING Information is widely based within the command and decisions are made at those levels where the most adequate information is available. Supervisors seek out information before making decisions.

MOTIVATION The command motivates personnel to contribute their best efforts through rewards for good performance and career enhancing duties. Disagreements are worked out with supervisor assistance.

HUMAN RESOURCE EMPHASIS The extent to which a command shows concern for human resources in the way it organizes its personnel to achieve its mission. The degree to which personnel within the command perceive that the organization and assignment of work sensibly considers the human element.

LOWER ECHELON INITIATIVE Subordinates within the command who have information or expertise in a particular area feel they have, or will have, the opportunity to influence decisions about their area of expertise or concern.

COMMAND CLIMATE--GENERAL Subordinates within the command feel that the human environment created by upper level supervisors, working conditions and other factors is reasonable, fair and rational. External factors are understood by the men they affect and their impact is diminished whenever possible.

SUPERVISOR LEADERSHIP

SUPPORT There is a good general feeling among subordinates about how they are treated by their leaders. Leaders behave in a way which increases the subordinates feeling of worth and dignity by being approachable and giving credit where due.

TEAMWORK Supervisors encourage subordinates to develop close, cooperative working relationships with one another.

GOAL EMPHASIS High standards of performance are set, maintained and encouraged by supervisors.

WORK FACILITATION Supervisors help subordinates improve their performance. Subordinates and supervisors work together to solve problems which hinder task completion and performance.

LEADERSHIP

SUPPORT There is a good general feeling among subordinates about each other. Subordinates behave toward each other in a manner which enhances each members feeling of personal worth.

TEAMWORK The behavior of work group members encourages the development of close cooperative working relationships.

GOAL EMPHASIS Work group members maintain and encourage high standards of performance.

WORK FACILITATION Work group members help each other improve performance. The work group works together to solve problems which hinder performance and task completion.

WORK GROUP COORDINATION Personnel within the work group see their jobs as essential and work well together, settling problems as they arise while striving to meet or exceed their objectives. The members of the work group provide support to each other's expertise when solving job-related problems.

DISSATISFACTION Measures the degree to which subordinates within the command are satisfied with the adequacy of the immediate supervisor, the effectiveness of the command, the job as a whole, the compatibility with work group members and present and future progress in the Navy.

INTEGRATION OF MEN AND MISSION The extent to which the command is seen as effective in getting people to meet the command's objectives and the extent to which the command is seen as meeting individual needs.

WID RESULTS The command meets its goal and mission requirements while maintaining traditionally high standards. Personnel assigned to the command take pride in being associated with such a unit.

TRAINING Measures the extent to which personnel have been trained to handle assigned tasks and emergency situations. The degree to which the command encourages training for both personal and professional goals and how the training is received by the work group.

COMMUNITY INTERRELATIONSHIPS Personnel are conscious and concerned with the image they project as representatives of the Navy in all locations, and of the United States when overseas. Personnel have been given sufficient training to be able to integrate into local community and expect to be dealt with fairly in economic transactions. Work group members look forward to visiting foreign countries.

RELATIONS/EQUAL OPPORTUNITY The command has an effective relations education program and equal opportunity affirmative action plan. There is an openness and willingness to address all issues within the command. The command insures equal opportunity and mobility for all assigned personnel. Military Justice as well as rewards and recognition are administered fairly and equitably throughout the command.

DRUG ABUSE EDUCATION There is openness within the command regarding drug abuse problems. The factors contributing to drug use are understood. The use of drugs is discouraged by peer group members. Drug abuse does not impinge on command effectiveness.

ALCOHOL ABUSE EDUCATION There is openness and willingness within the command to identify and communicate regarding alcohol abuse problems. Alcohol abuse is discouraged by peer group members. Members can identify alcoholism and recognize alcoholism as a treatable illness.

CAREER COUNSELLING The command has an effective career counselling program and a positive influence on people to reenlist.

52Z MAR 74

CPACFLT MAKALAPA HI

Exhibit 12

YCOMSPAC

A/COMNAVFOR JAPAN YOKOSUKA JA

A/COMNAVMAIANAS GUAM MARIANAS ISLAND

A/COMNAVFOR KOREA YONGSAN KS

A/COMUSNAVPHIL SUBIC BAY RP

A/COMSEVENTH FLT

P/COMTHIRDFLT

A/HUMRESMANCEN PEARL HARBOR HI

E/HUMRESMANCEN SAN DIEGO CA

SETPAC PEARL HARBOR HI

04Z MAR 74

WASHINGTON DC

BSAA/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA

A/CINCPACFLT MAKALAPA HI

A/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

A CNET PENSACOLA FL

//N05250//

CONFIDENTIALITY OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (HRM) SURVEY INFORMATION

NAVINST 5300.6A

OP A DESCRIBES THE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CYCLE AND SPECIFIES THAT THE SCINCS SHALL INSURE THAT ALL COMMANDS WITHIN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND WILL BE FILED FOR A SURVEY FOLLOWED BY A DEDICATED HRM AVAILABILITY (HRAV). THE DEVELOPED FROM THE SURVEY IS USED BY COMMANDING OFFICERS TO IDENTIFY PROBLEMS IN LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, RACE RELATIONS, DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE, CULTURAL RELATIONS AND CAREER COUNSELING.

TO BE OF VALUE TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER, THIS SURVEY, OF NECESSITY, MUST BE CONDUCTED IN AREAS OF SENSITIVITY. IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO GET HONEST ANSWERS TO ASSIST COMMANDING OFFICERS AND DO THIS WITH THEIR COOPERATION AND SUPPORT, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT NONE OF THE SURVEY DATA BE DISCLOSED WITHIN THE COMMANDING OFFICER'S CHAIN OF COMMAND THAT CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO A SPECIFIC COMMAND, EXCEPT AS REQUIRED BY THAT COMMANDING OFFICER. TO PERMIT OTHERWISE WOULD ERODE THE INTEGRITY OF COMMAND AND ULTIMATELY AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF SURVEY DATA.

THE CNO, THEREFORE, DESIRES TO ESTABLISH A POLICY WITHIN THE NAVY THAT SURVEY DATA, ATTRIBUTABLE TO ANY SPECIFIC NAVY COMMAND, WILL BE DISCLOSED ONLY TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND THOSE PERSONNEL HE DESIGNATES, THE HRM SPECIALISTS ASSISTING THE COMMANDING OFFICER, AND THOSE ACTIVITIES SPECIFIED BY THE CNO. DEVIATIONS FROM THIS POLICY WILL NOT BE PERMITTED EXCEPT UPON APPROVAL OF THE DCNO (MANPOWER)

072104Z MAR 74 082052Z MAR 74

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT TEAM # Z

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

CDR ALLEN C. REAGAN, USN

Naval Aviator
Helicopter Anti-Submarine Warfare
Education: BA Economics
MS Management

CWO3 WILLIAM G. HARRIS, USN

Surface Warfare Officer
Human Resources Management School Graduate, Memphis, Tenn.

MCPO WALTER H. HUNTON, USN

Maintenance Chief HS, VFAW, VW, and VAP Squadrons
Division Officer/Production Control Chief, Aircraft Maintenance
Dept. at Naval Air Station
Navy Human Resource Management School Graduate, Memphis, Tenn.

SCPO ROGER B. JACOBY, USN

Director/Senior Counselor of an Overseas Counseling and
Assistance Center
Studying for BA in Psychology

CPO FREDRICK T. TEVIS, USN

Teletype Maintenance and Senior Radioman in an AOE
Defense Race Relations Institute
Navy Race Relations School

PO1 DOUGLAS A. GRAHAM, USN

LPO B Division and Leading Boilerman, RRES, Minority Affairs
Rep., in an LPH
Defense Race Relations Institute, Patrick AFB, Florida
Navy Race Relations School, Key West, Florida

All team personnel have had formal Navy schooling and experience
in one or more Human Resource Management areas.

Exhibit 13

KEEPING INFORMED

Human Relations or Human Resources?

By RAYMOND E. MILES



REPRINTED FROM
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
JULY-AUGUST 1965

*Reprints of Harvard Business Review articles
are available at the following prices:*

Single reprint	\$ 1.00	Additional 100's up	
Two reprints	1.30	to 1,000, each	\$ 20.00
Three reprints	1.50	First 1,000	215.00
Four to 99, each	0.40	Additional 100's	
First 100	39.70	over 1,000, each	15.00

*These prices apply to total quantity of reprints
(whether for the same or assorted articles) ordered at
one time. When ordering individual articles, please
list by author, month, and year rather than title.
Postage is prepaid on orders shipped via parcel post
or third class mail. Allow 21 days for normal delivery.
For faster service add 50¢ for special handling charges
on orders of over 100 reprints.*

Reprint Service

Harvard Business Review

Soldiers Field, Boston, Massachusetts 02163

Harvard **Business** *Review*

JULY/AUGUST 1965

VOL. 43, NO. 4



Edward C. Bursk: EDITOR

JOHN F. CHAPMAN, *Executive Editor*
 VIRGINIA B. FALES, *Managing Editor*
 DAVID W. EWING, *Associate Editor*
 G. SCOTT HUTCHISON, *Associate Editor*
 STEPHEN A. GREYSER, *Assistant Editor*
 T. K. WORTHINGTON, *General Manager*
 ERNEST D. FRAWLEY, *Controller*
 RAY KING, *Art Director*

Editorial, Business, Circulation Offices
 Soldiers Field, Boston, Massachusetts 02163

Annual index is published in the November-December issue. Contents are indexed in the *Business Periodicals Index* and *Bulletin of the Public Affairs Information Service*.

BUSINESS REVIEW BOARD

GEORGE P. BAKER, DEAN, *Ex Officio*
 ROBERT W. AUSTIN, *Chairman*
 RAYMOND A. BAUER
 EDWARD C. BURSK
 PAUL W. CHERINGTON
 GORDON DONALDSON
 BERTRAND FOX
 RALPH W. HIDDY
 WINFIELD G. KNOPF
 E. ROBERT LIVERNASH
 EDWARD RAIFFA
 PHILIP THURSTON
 FRANK L. TUCKER
 ARTHUR N. TURNER
 RICHARD F. VANCIL
 CLARK L. WILSON

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW


July-August 1965, Vol. 43, No. 4
 Published bimonthly by the Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. Printed in U.S.A.

Second-class postage paid at Boston, Mass., and at additional mailing offices.

© 1965 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

- 6 MANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS**
Simon Ramo
- 14 ARE WOMEN EXECUTIVES PEOPLE?**
G. W. Bowman, N. B. Worthy, and S. A. Greyser
- 45 RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOCIAL CHANGE**
Robert W. Austin
- 53 ART AND SCIENCE OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING**
Franz Edelman
- 67 MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE FOR SMALL BUSINESS**
L. T. White
- 75 THE STRATEGY OF PRICE DEALS**
Charles L. Hinkle
- 86 ORGANIZATIONAL PARADOX**
Lyman K. Randall
- 88 CHARTER OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EXECUTIVES**
Phil N. Scheid
- 99 HOW TO ANALYZE THAT PROBLEM**
Perrin Stryker
- 111 ADVERTISING AGENCY SERVICES: MAKE OR BUY?**
Derek A. Newton
- 119 REPURCHASE STOCK TO REVITALIZE EQUITY**
Charles D. Ellis
- 129 RETAIL REORGANIZATION**
Wheelock H. Bingham and David L. Yunich
- 148 HUMAN RELATIONS OR HUMAN RESOURCES?**
Raymond E. Miles

KEEPING INFORMED



Human Relations OR Human Resources?

Recent evidence indicates that business managers have now adopted not one but two theories of participative leadership. For their subordinates, managers prefer a human relations approach, aimed at improving morale and reducing resistance to formal authority. For themselves, however, they prefer a human resources approach, whereby they want their superiors to recognize and make full use of their own currently wasted talents. The author is Raymond E. Miles, Assistant Professor of Business Administration at the University of California, Berkeley.

• THE EDITORS

The proselyting efforts of the advocates of participative management appear to have paid off. The typical modern manager, on paper at least, broadly endorses participation and rejects traditional, autocratic concepts of leadership and control as no longer acceptable or, perhaps, no longer legitimate.

However, while participation has apparently been well merchandised and widely purchased, there seems to be a great deal of confusion about what has been sold and what has been bought. Managers do not appear to have accepted a single, logically consistent concept of participation. In fact, there is reason to believe that managers have adopted two different theories or models of participation — one for themselves and one for their subordinates.

These statements reflect both my analysis of the development of the theory of participative management and my interpretation of managers' attitudes toward these concepts.

My views are based in part on a number of recent surveys of managers' beliefs and opinions. The most recent of these studies, which I conducted, was begun with a group of 215 middle and upper level managers in West Coast companies, and has been continued with a sample of over 300 administrators from public agencies.¹ This study was designed to clarify further certain aspects of managers' attitudes uncovered by earlier research under the direction of Dale Yoder of Stanford² and Profs. Mason Haire, Edwin

Ghiselli, and Lyman Porter of the University of California, Berkeley.³

This series of studies involved the collection of questionnaire data on managers' opinions about people and on their attitudes toward various leadership policies and practices. Several thousand managers in all, both here and abroad, have participated.

This article is not intended to summarize all of the findings on managers' leadership attitudes available from these studies. Rather, my primary purpose is to construct a theoretical framework that may explain some of the principal dimensions of managers' views and some of the implications of their beliefs and opinions, drawing on the research simply to illustrate my views.

PARTICIPATIVE THEORIES

While the suggestion that managers have accepted a two-sided approach to participation may be disturbing, it should not be too surprising. Management theorists have frequently failed to deal with participation in a thorough and consistent manner. Indeed, from an examination of their somewhat ambivalent treatment of this concept, it is possible to conclude that they have been selling two significantly different models of participative management.

▼ One of the scholars' models, which we will designate the *human relations* model, closely resembles the concept of participation which managers appear to accept for use with their own subordinates.

▲ The second, and not yet fully developed, theory, which I have la-

beled the *human resources* model, prescribes the sort of participative policies that managers would apparently like their superiors to follow.

I shall develop and examine these two models, compare them with managers' expressed beliefs, and consider some of the implications of managers' dual allegiance to them.

Both the *human relations* and the *human resources* models have three basic components:

1. A set of assumptions about people's values and capabilities.
2. Certain prescriptions as to the amount and kind of participative policies and practices that managers should follow, in keeping with their assumptions about people.
3. A set of expectations with respect to the effects of participation on subordinate morale and performance.

This third component contains the model's explanation of how and why participation works — that is, the purpose of participation and how it accomplishes this purpose. In outline form, the models may be summarized as shown in EXHIBIT I.

HUMAN RELATIONS MODEL

This approach is not new. As early as the 1920's, business spokesmen began to challenge the classical autocratic philosophy of management. The employee was no longer pictured as merely an appendage to a machine, seeking only economic rewards from his work. Managers were instructed to consider him as a "whole man" rather than as merely a bundle of

skills and aptitudes.⁴ They were urged to create a "sense of satisfaction" among their subordinates by showing interest in the employees' personal success and welfare. As Bendix notes, the "failure to treat workers as human beings came to be regarded as the cause of low morale, poor craftsmanship, unresponsiveness, and confusion."⁵

The key element in the *human relations* approach is its basic objective of making organizational members *feel* a useful and important part of the overall effort. This process is viewed as the means of accomplishing the ultimate goal of building a cooperative and compliant work force. Participation, in this model, is a lubricant which oils away resistance to formal au-

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This article has benefited greatly from the comments of Professors Mason Haire and George Strauss of the University of California, Berkeley.

¹ See Raymond E. Miles, "Conflicting Elements in Managerial Ideologies," *Industrial Relations*, October 1964, pp. 77-91. The subsequent research with public administrators is still being conducted, and reports have not yet been published.

² See Dale Yoder, "Management Theories as Managers See Them," *Personnel*, July-August 1962, pp. 25-30; "Management Policies for the Future," *Personnel Administration*, September-October 1962, pp. 11-14 ff.; Dale Yoder et al., "Managers' Theories of Management," *Journal of the Academy of Management*, September 1963, pp. 204-211.

³ See Mason Haire, Edwin Ghiselli, and Lyman W. Porter, "Cultural Patterns in the Role of the Manager," *Industrial Relations*, February 1963, pp. 95-117, for a report on the Berkeley studies.

⁴ See Reinhard Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry* (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1956), pp. 287-340.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

EXHIBIT I. TWO MODELS OF PARTICIPATIVE LEADERSHIP

HUMAN RELATIONS

HUMAN RESOURCES

ATTITUDES TOWARD PEOPLE

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. People in our culture share a common set of needs — to belong, to be liked, to be respected. 2. They desire individual recognition but, more than this, they want to feel a useful part of the company and their own work group or department. 3. They will tend to cooperate willingly and comply with organizational goals if these important needs are fulfilled. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In addition to sharing common needs for belonging and respect, most people in our culture desire to contribute effectively and creatively to the accomplishment of worthwhile objectives. 2. The majority of our work force is capable of exercising far more initiative, responsibility, and creativity than their present jobs require or allow. 3. These capabilities represent untapped resources which are presently being wasted. |
|---|--|

KIND AND AMOUNT OF PARTICIPATION

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The manager's basic task is to make each worker believe that he is a useful and important part of the department "team." <p>The manager should be willing to explain his decisions and to discuss his subordinates' objections to his plans. On routine matters, he should encourage his subordinates to participate in planning and choosing among alternative solutions to problems.</p> <p>Within narrow limits, the work group or individual subordinates should be allowed to exercise self-direction and self-control in carrying out plans.</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The manager's basic task is to create an environment in which his subordinates can contribute their full range of talents to the accomplishment of organizational goals. He must attempt to uncover and tap the creative resources of his subordinates. 2. The manager should allow, and encourage, his subordinates to participate not only in routine decisions but in important matters as well. In fact, the more important a decision is to the manager's department, the greater should be his effort to tap the department's resources. 3. The manager should attempt to continually expand the areas over which his subordinates exercise self-direction and self-control as they develop and demonstrate greater insight and ability. |
|---|---|

EXPECTATIONS

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>Sharing information with subordinates and involving them in departmental decision making will help satisfy their basic needs for belonging and for individual recognition.</p> <p>Satisfying these needs will improve subordinate morale and reduce resistance to formal authority.</p> <p>High employee morale and reduced resistance to formal authority may lead to improved departmental performance. It should at least reduce intradepartment friction and thus make the manager's job easier.</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The overall quality of decision making and performance will improve as the manager makes use of the full range of experience, insight, and creative ability in his department. 2. Subordinates will exercise responsible self-direction and self-control in the accomplishment of worthwhile objectives that they understand and have helped establish. 3. Subordinate satisfaction will increase as a by-product of improved performance and the opportunity to contribute creatively to this improvement. |
|---|--|

RE: It may fairly be argued that what I call the *human relations* model is actually the product of popularization and misunderstanding of the work of pioneers in this field. Moreover, it is true that some of the early research and writings of the human relationists contain concepts which seem to fall within the framework of what I call the *human resources* model. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that while the early writers did not advocate the *human relations* model as presented here, their failure to emphasize certain of the *human resources* concepts left their work open to the misinterpretations which have occurred.

ority. By discussing problems with his subordinates and acknowledging their individual needs and desires, the manager hopes to build a cohesive work team that is willing and anxious to tangle with organizational problems.

One further clue to the way in which participation is viewed in this approach is provided in Dubin's concept of "privilege pay."⁶ The manager "buys" cooperation by letting his subordinates in on departmental information and allowing them to discuss and state their opinions on various departmental problems. He "pays a price" for allowing his subordinates the privilege of participating in certain decisions and exercising some self-direction. In return he hopes to obtain their cooperation in carrying out these and other decisions for the accomplishment of departmental objectives.

Implicit in this model is the idea that it might actually be easier and more efficient if the manager could merely make departmental decisions without bothering to involve his subordinates. However, the advocates of this model point out, there are two parts to any decision — (1) the making of the decision and (2) the activities required to carry it out. In many instances, this model suggests, the manager might do better to "waste time" in discussing the problem with his subordinates, and perhaps even to accept suggestions that he believes may be less efficient, in order to get the decision carried out.

In sum, the *human relations* approach does not bring out the fact that participation may be useful in its own sake. The possibility that subordinates will, in fact, bring to light points which the manager may have overlooked, if considered at all, tends to be mentioned only in passing. This is stated as a potential side benefit which, while not normally expected, may occasionally occur. Instead, the manager is urged to adopt participative leadership policies as the least-cost method of obtaining cooperation and getting his decisions accepted.

In many ways the *human re-*

lations model represents only a slight departure from traditional autocratic models of management. The method of achieving results is different, and employees are viewed in more humanistic terms, but the basic roles of the manager and his subordinates remain essentially the same. The ultimate goal sought in both the traditional and the *human relations* model is compliance with managerial authority.

HUMAN RESOURCES MODEL

This approach represents a dramatic departure from traditional concepts of management. Though not yet fully developed, it is emerging from the writings of McGregor, Likert, Haire, and others as a new and significant contribution to management thought.⁷ The magnitude of its departure from previous models is illustrated first of all in its basic assumptions concerning people's values and abilities, which focus attention on all organization members as reservoirs of untapped resources. These resources include not only physical skills and energy, but also creative ability and the capacity for responsible, self-directed, self-controlled behavior. Given these assumptions about people, the manager's job cannot be viewed merely as one of giving direction and obtaining cooperation. Instead, his primary task becomes that of creating an environment in which the total resources of his department can be utilized.

The second point at which the *human resources* model differs dramatically from previous models is in its views on the purpose and goal of participation. In this model the manager does not share information, discuss departmental decisions, or encourage self-direction and self-control merely to improve subordinate satisfaction and morale. Rather, the purpose of these practices is to improve the decision making and total performance efficiency of the organization. The *human resources* model suggests that many decisions may actually be made more efficiently by those directly involved in and affected by the decisions.

Similarly, this model implies that control is often most efficiently exercised by those directly involved in the work in process, rather than by someone or some group removed from the actual point of operation. Moreover, the *human resources* model does not suggest that the manager allow participation only in routine decisions. Instead, it implies that the more important the decision, the greater is his *obligation* to encourage ideas and suggestions from his subordinates.

In the same vein, this model does not suggest that the manager allow his subordinates to exercise self-direction and self-control only when they are carrying out relatively unimportant assignments. In fact, it suggests that the area over which subordinates exercise self-direction and control should be continually broadened in keeping with their growing experience and ability.


The crucial point at which this model differs dramatically from other models is in its explanation of the causal relationship between satisfaction and performance. In the *human relations* approach improvement in subordinate satisfaction is viewed as an intervening variable which is the ultimate cause of improved performance. Diagrammatically, the causal relationship can be illustrated as in EXHIBIT II.

In the *human resources* model the causal relationship between satisfaction and performance is viewed quite differently. Increased subordinate satisfaction is not pictured as the primary cause of

⁶ Robert Dubin, *The World of Work* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), pp. 243-244. It should be noted that Dubin treats the concept of privilege pay within a framework which goes beyond the *human relations* approach and, in some respects, is close to the *human resources* model.

⁷ See particularly Douglas McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960); Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961); and Mason Haire, "The Concept of Power and the Concept of Man," in *Social Science Approaches to Business Behavior*, edited by George Strother (Homewood, Illinois, The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962), pp. 163-183.

EXHIBIT II. HUMAN RELATIONS MODEL



improved performance; improvement results directly from creative contributions which subordinates make to departmental decision making, direction, and control. Subordinates' satisfaction is viewed instead as a by-product of the process — the result of their having made significant contributions to organizational success. In diagram form the *human resources* model can be illustrated as in EXHIBIT III.

The *human resources* model does not deny a relationship between participation and morale. It suggests that subordinates' satisfaction may well increase as they play more and more meaningful roles in decision making and control. Moreover, the model recognizes that improvements in morale may not only set the stage for expanded participation, but create an atmosphere which supports creative problem solving. Nevertheless, this model rejects as unsup-

ported the concept that the improvement of morale is a necessary or sufficient cause of improved decision making and control. Those improvements come directly from the full utilization of the organization's resources.

MANAGERS' OWN VIEWS

Which approach to participative management do managers actually follow? It was suggested earlier that managers' views appear to reflect both models. When they talk about the kind and amount of participation appropriate for their subordinates, they express concepts that appear to be similar to those in the *human relations* model. On the other hand, when they consider their own relationships with their superiors, their views seem to flow from the *human resources* model. A brief review of the relevant findings suggests some of the bases for this interpretation.

Participation for subordinates — When we look at managers' views on the use of participative policies and practices with the subordinates who report to them, two points seem clear:

▼ Managers generally accept and endorse the use of participative concepts.


▲ However, they frequently doubt their subordinates' capacity for self-direction and self-control, and their ability to contribute creatively to departmental decision making.

In the Stanford studies, an overwhelming majority of managers indicated their agreement with statements emphasizing the desirability of subordinate participation in decision making.⁸ In the Berkeley studies, a majority of the managers in each of 11 countries, including the United States, indicated their agreement with such concepts as sharing information with subordinates and increasing subordinate influence and self-control.⁹ Similarly, in my recent studies, managers overwhelmingly endorsed participative leadership policies.

On the other hand, while managers appear to have great faith in participative policies, they do not indicate such strong belief in their subordinates' capabilities. For example, the Berkeley group in their international study found that managers tended to have a "basic lack of confidence in others" and typically did not believe that capacity for leadership and initiative was widely distributed among subordinates.¹⁰ In my own study, managers in every group to date have rated their subordinates and rank-and-file employees well below themselves, particularly on such important managerial traits as responsibility, judgment, and initiative.

But if managers do not expect creative, meaningful contributions from their subordinates, why do they advocate participative management? A reasonable answer seems to be that they advocate participative concepts as a means of improving subordinate morale and satisfaction. This interpretation gains support from my recent studies. Here, managers were

EXHIBIT III. HUMAN RESOURCES MODEL



asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with statements predicting improved morale and satisfaction and statements predicting improved performance as the result of following various participative leadership policies. In connection with each of these policies, managers indicated consistently greater agreement with the predictions of improved morale than with the predictions of improved performance.

The fact that managers appear to have serious doubts about the values and capabilities of those reporting to them seems to rule out their acceptance of the *human resources* model for use with their subordinates. On the other hand, the fact that they do endorse participation and seem quite certain about its positive impact on morale suggests a close relationship between their views and those expressed in the *human relations* model. Moreover, the types of participative policies which managers most strongly advocate seem to support this interpretation.

In my research, managers indicate strongest agreement with policies that advocate sharing information and discussing objectives with subordinates. However, they tend to be somewhat less enamored with the policies which suggest increasing subordinate self-direction and self-control. This pattern of participation seems much closer to that of the *human relations* approach than to the pattern advocated in the *human resources* model.

Participation for themselves — When I examined managers' views toward their relationships with their own superiors, a much different pattern of responses became evident:

(1) Managers in my studies tend to see little, if any, difference between their own capabilities and those of their superiors. In fact, they tend to rate themselves equal to, if not higher than, their superiors on such traits as *creativity, ingenuity, flexibility, and willingness to change*.

(2) When asked to indicate at which levels in their organizations they feel each of the participative policies would be most appropriate, managers invariably feel most strongly

ly that the full range of participative policies should be used by their own superiors.

More importantly, they also tend to be most certain that these participative policies will result in improved organizational performance *at their own level*.

Thus, when managers discuss the type of participative policies which their superiors should follow with managers at their own level, they appear to espouse the *human resources* model. They see themselves as reservoirs of creative resources. Moreover, the fact that they frequently view themselves as more flexible and willing to change than their superiors suggests that they feel their resources are frequently wasted. Correspondingly, they expect improvement in organizational performance to result from greater freedom for self-direction and self-control on their part.

REASONS BEHIND VIEWS

If the evidence of the current survey does represent managers' attitudes toward participative leadership, one serious question immediately comes to mind. How can managers desire one type of authority and control relationship with their superiors and at the same time advocate another type with their subordinates? A general answer, of course, is that this pattern of attitudes is just human nature. We tend not only to think more highly of ourselves than we do of others, but also to want more than we are willing to give. There are, however, other logical, more specific explanations for managers' reluctance to accept the *human resources* model for use with their subordinates.

In the first place, the *human relations* model has been around much longer, and an exceptionally good selling job has been done in its behalf. The causal relationship among participation, satisfaction, and performance, despite a lack of empirical validation, has become common wisdom. The *human resources* model, on the other hand, has not been as fully or systematically developed, and has not been the subject of as hard a sell.

Managers may "feel" some of the concepts expressed in the *human resources* model and intuitively grasp some of their implications for their relationships with their superiors, but little pressure has been put on them to translate their attitudes into a systematic model for use with their subordinates.

A second explanation for managers' failure to accept the *human resources* model for use with their subordinates is that they are simply reluctant to "buy" a theory that challenges concepts to which they are deeply and emotionally attached. There is no question that the *human resources* model does attack a number of traditional management concepts. Two of the bedrock concepts that are directly challenged deal with: (1) the origins and applicability of management prerogatives, and (2) the source and limits of control.

The *human resources* model recognizes no definable, immutable set of management prerogatives. It does not accept the classical division between those who think and command and those who obey and perform. Instead, it argues that the solution to any given problem may arise from a variety of sources, and that to think of management (or any other group) as sufficient in and of itself to make all decisions is misleading and wasteful.

This approach does not directly challenge the "legal" right of management to command. It suggests, however, that there is a higher "law of the situation" that thoughtful managers will usually observe, deferring to expertise wherever it may be found. In this model the manager's basic obligation is not to the "management team" but to the accomplishment of departmental and organizational objectives. The criterion of success, therefore, is not the extent to which orders are carried out but the results obtained.

Admitting that he may not have

* Yoder et al, "Managers' Theories of Management," op. cit.

"Haure, Ghiselli, and Porter, op. cit.

"Haure, Ghiselli, and Porter, op. cit.

all the answers is as difficult for the manager as for any of the rest of us. He has been taught to hide his deficiencies, not to advertise them. Holding on to information, maintaining close control, and reserving the right to make all decisions are ways by which the manager can ensure his importance. Further, many organizations have reinforced this type of behavior either (a) by failing to emphasize the manager's obligation to develop and utilize his human resources or (b) by failing to reward him when he does make this effort.

In the area of control the *human resources* model challenges the traditional concept that control is a scarce resource. In traditional theory there is presumed to be a virtually fixed amount of control. This fixed amount can be distributed in a variety of ways, but control given to one group must eventually be taken away from another. Given this concept, the manager is reluctant to allow his subordinates any real degree of self-control — what he gives up to them, he loses himself. In fact, it is frequently this basic fear of losing control which limits the amount of participation that managers are willing to allow.

The *human resources* model does not accept this lump-of-control theory. Instead, it argues that the manager increases his total control over the accomplishment of departmental objectives by encouraging self-control on the part of his subordinates. Control is thus an additive and an expanding phenomenon. Where subordinates are concerned with accomplishing goals and exercising self-direction and self-control, their combined efforts will far outweigh the results of the exercise of any amount of control by the manager.

Moreover, the fact that subordinates desire to exercise greater self-control does not mean that they reject the manager's legitimate concern for goal accomplishment. Rather, there is evidence that they in fact seek a partnership that will allow them to play a larger role, yet also will allow for a corresponding increase in management's control activity.¹¹

In all, the fact that managers are reluctant to adopt a model which forces them to rethink, and perhaps restructure, their perceptions of their own roles and functions is not surprising. It is also not surprising that some writers in this field have hesitated to advocate a model which challenges such deeply held concepts. The *human relations* approach is easy to "buy," since it does not challenge the manager's basic role or status. It is correspondingly easy to sell, since it promises much and actually demands little. The *human resources* model, on the other hand, promises much but also demands a great deal from the manager. It requires that he undertake the responsibility of utilizing all the resources available to him — his own and those of his subordinates. It does not suggest that it will make his job easier; it only acknowledges his obligation to do a much better job.

LOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

The nature of the evidence to date does not warrant any firm or sweeping conclusions. Nevertheless, it does suggest enough support for the interpretations made here to make it worthwhile, and perhaps imperative, to draw some logical implications from the fact that managers seem to have adopted two apparently conflicting attitudes regarding participative management.

The first implication, and the easiest one to draw, is that, given managers' present attitudes, the *human resources* model has little chance of ever gaining real acceptance as a guide to managers' relationships with their subordinates. Managers at every level view themselves as capable of greater self-direction and self-control, but apparently do not attribute such abilities to their subordinates. As long as managers throughout the organizational hierarchy remain unaware that the kind of participation *they* want and believe *they* are capable of handling is also the kind their subordinates want and feel they deserve, there would seem to be little hope for the *human resources* ap-

proach being actually put into practice.

A second, and somewhat more complex, implication of managers' current views is that real participation will seldom be found in modern organizations. Participation, in the *human relations* model, is viewed as an "ought" rather than a "must." The manager is under no basic obligation to seek out and develop talent, or to encourage and allow participation; it is something which he "probably should do" but not something for which he is made to feel truly responsible. Viewing participation in this fashion, the manager often junks it when problems arise or pressure builds up from above — the very times when it might be expected to produce the greatest gains.

A third implication, closely related to the second, is that the benefits which the *human resources* approach predicts from participative management will not accrue as long as managers cling to the *human relations* view. From the *human relations* model, a manager may draw a rule for decision making which says that he should allow only as much participation, self-direction, and self-control as is required to obtain cooperation and reduce resistance to formal authority. In the area of job enlargement, for example, the manager following the *human relations* model would be tempted to enlarge his subordinates' jobs just enough to improve morale and satisfaction, with little real concern for making full use of their abilities. This limited approach borders on pseudoparticipation and may be interpreted by subordinates as just another manipulative technique.

The *human resources* model, on the other hand, does not hold the manager to so limited a decision rule. In fact, it affirms that he is obligated to develop and encourage a continually expanding degree of responsible participation, self-direction, and self-control. The only

¹¹ See Claggett C. Smith and Arnold Tannenbaum, "Organizational Control Structure: A Comparative Analysis," *Human Relations*, November 1963, pp. 299-316.

limiting factors legitimate in this approach are the basic requirements of capacity to perform and the need for coordination. The manager following the *human resources* model would therefore continually expand subordinates' responsibility and self-direction up to the limits of their abilities, and/or to the point at which further expansion would produce a wasteful overlap among the responsibilities of members of his department. Even these limits, however, are far from absolute. The *human resources* model suggests that with subordinates' broadened abilities and expanded information, voluntary cooperation can ease much of the need for specific job boundaries.

A fourth and final implication can be drawn from managers' confused and conflicting attitudes toward participative management. Managers' attitudes, as suggested earlier, in part reflect the ambivalent and inconsistent treatment which scholars have given to participative leadership concepts, and are not likely to change until these firms up their own thinking.

THE FINAL COMMENTS

It must be clear at this point that I feel that management scholars should focus their attention on developing and promoting the application of the *human resources* approach. While I cannot, at this stage, base my preference for the *human resources* model on solid empirical evidence, there is one strong argument for its potential usefulness. It is the fact that managers up and down the organizational hierarchy believe their superiors should follow this model. Critics of the *human resources*

approach have argued that (1) its costs outweigh its benefits because in its final form the *human resources* model prescribes management by committee at every level, which results in wasted effort and the inability to act in crisis situations; and (2) this approach is unsuitable for organizations or organizational groups whose members have neither the desire nor the ability to meet its challenge.

In answer to the first charge, this approach does imply a need for additional information flow to subordinates at all levels, and I admit that collecting and disseminating information increases costs.

However, information collected and used at lower levels may be less costly than information collected for use at upper levels that is subsequently ignored or misused. Further, and more important, the application of the *human resources* model does not require — in fact, would make unnecessary — committee-type sharing of routine departmental tasks.

This model would suggest that subordinates are generally willing to go along with their superiors' decisions on more or less routine matters, particularly when they are well informed and feel free to call important points to their bosses' attention. Moreover, this approach implies that many matters are to be delegated directly to one or more subordinates who, in most instances, will coordinate their own activities. At the same time, this model emphasizes that full and extended discussion by the whole department will be utilized where it can do the most good — on complex and important problems that demand the full talent and complete concern of the group.

One could argue that under these circumstances crises should arise less often and consensus should be more quickly reached when they do arise.

There is no quick and easy answer to the second charge that the *human resources* model is more adaptable to and more easily applied with some groups than with others. Note, however, that it is the *human relations* approach, and not the *human resources* model, which promises quick and easy application. The latter cannot be put into full-blown practice overnight in any situation, particularly where subordinates have been conditioned by years of traditional or pseudoparticipative techniques of leadership. It involves a step-by-step procedure wherein the manager expands subordinates' responsibilities and participation in keeping with their developing abilities and concerns. High expectations and full support, coupled with an open recognition of the inevitability of occasional shortcomings, are required to achieve successful application.

Finally, there is a familiar ring to the critics' charge that many organization members are either unwilling or unable to contribute creatively, or to accept any real measure of responsibility. In fact, this charge brings us back once again to the heart of the conflict in managers' attitudes toward participation — their own view that subordinates are suited only for the *human relations* type of participation, while they themselves are well suited for the full range of participation suggested in the *human resources* model.

— Raymond E. Miles

Organization Wire Diagram




Exhibit 15

Organization Wire Diagram





Exhibit 15

Exhibit 16
SURVEY PRINTOUT

Survey printout is held by CDR R. A. McGonigal,
Code 55 Mb, Department of Operations Research
and Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

Exhibit 17
DIMENSION/INDEX/PROGRAM

CAUSAL FLOW



Number	Name
1	COMMUNICATION FLOW
7	SUPPORT
8	TEAMWORK
9	GOAL EMPHASIS
10	WORK FACILITATION
11	SUPPORT
12	TEAMWORK
22	DRUG ABUSE EDUCATION
23	ALCOHOL ABUSE EDUCATION

FIGURE 4.

Step 5: Considering the data record in Figure 4, record your answers to the following questions in the space provided:

- Are the entries spread through the causal flow: Or clustered around certain processes? *MOSTLY CLUSTERED AROUND SUPERVISORY LEADERSHIP*

2. What relations do you see between Command Climate dimensions listed and the other part in the causal flow? It would appear that poor communications flow may be affecting the quality of Supervisory leadership. With all facets of supervisory leadership being affected, it impacts on the quality of the peer support and teamwork.
3. What relations do you see between Supervisor Leadership indices listed and the other parts in the causal flow? same as above
4. What relations do you see between Peer Leadership indices listed and the other parts in the causal flow? Although it is not all that low, it could indicate that work group members have developed cohesion as a means to overcome deficiencies in the supervisory leadership.
5. What relations do you see between Work Group Coordination dimension and the other parts in the causal flow? It is higher by comparison
6. What relations do you see between End Results Measures indices and the other parts in the causal flow? Very high. People must enjoy their work and feel their jobs are important and contributing to the overall mission
7. Overall, why do you feel these indices were the lowest six? No. There are other dimensions which have much lower means that break out with higher percentile scores. All but one of them fall in the area of Command Climate

What relations do you see between the Human Goals Programs indices and the parts in the causal flow? *They are higher from a percentile score basis and mean score*

^{you}
Why do you feel these Human Goals Programs indices were the lowest?
It may be due to a lack of awareness ^{and understanding} on the part of the older and more senior personnel.

Another dimensional analysis which provides insight as to how the dimension/indices listed in Figure 4 affects the various pay grades in the Command, the Levels Analysis. This Analysis will give you a feel for how the various factors in the Causal Flow are passing through the Command. For more details this refer to Module 6, Consultant Manual.

To assist in conducting this analysis the following procedure is suggested.

- Step 1: Transcribe the dimension/index numbers and names from Figure 4 to the appropriate spaces in Figure 5.
- Step 2: Locate REPORT HG-04 Command Index Mean Gap Comparison for Pay Grades.
- Step 3: Locate and identify on Report HG-04 the eight dimension/index numbers which appear in Figure 5.

Procedure: Circle the number and draw a line under the data that applies to the dimension/index.

- Step 4: Review the underlined data by pay grades and determine which of the underlined dimension/indices have the lowest scores. Since gaps between Command and pay grade means are reported, the lowest scores represented would be the highest negative number.

OVERALL COMMAND'S LOWEST
DIMENSION/INDICES (FROM FIG. __)

OF COMMAND 8 LOWEST DIMENSION/
INDICES, LOWEST 2 FOR PAY GRADE

PAY
GRADE

Flow	No.	Name
CC	1	COMMUNICATIONS FLOW
SL	7. SUPPORT 8. TEAMWORK 9. GOAL EMPHASIS 10. WORK FACILITATION	
PL	11. SUPPORT 12. TEAMWORK	
WGC		
ERM		
HG	22. DRUG ABUSE EDUCATION 23. ALCOHOL ABUSE EDUCATION	

No.	Name	
	NO DATA AVAILABLE	05 & ABOVE
	NO DATA AVAILABLE	04
9	GOAL EMPHASIS (SL)	03
10	WORK FACILITATION (SL)	
7	SUPPORT (SL)	01-02
10	WORK FACILITATION (SL)	
	NO DATA AVAILABLE	WO
9.	GOAL EMPHASIS (SL)	E7-E9
11.	SUPPORT (PL)	
11.	SUPPORT (PL)	E-6
12.	TEAMWORK (PL)	
1.	COMMUNICATION FLOW	E4-E5
22.	DRUG ABUSE EDUCATION	
7.	SUPPORT (SL)	E1-E3
8.	TEAMWORK (SL)	

FIGURE 5

Procedure: Record the names of the two lowest dimensions/indices scores of the ^{eight} Overall Command ^{dimensions/indices} ~~eight~~ for each pay grade in the space provided in Figure 5.

Step 5: Considering the data recorded in Figure 5, record your answers to the following question in the space provided:

1. Look for similarities and differences found between levels. What inferences do you draw:

Similarities: Work Facilitation (SL) 01-02 + 03 } Planning + support appear to stick out.
 GOAL EMPHASIS (SL) 03 + E7-E9
 SUPPORT (SL) 01-02 + E1-E3
 SUPPORT (PL) E6 + E7-E9

Differences: The E4-E5 level sees comms as the weakness. All other levels were about the same.

2. Are things affecting the top level being passed down? What forms do they take? There is no data for the 05 + 04 levels. It appears that if the top level isn't communicating goals + plans it is affecting all levels below. There maybe a communications break at the E6-E5/4 level.

3. Work-related indices (i.e. Goals Emphasis, Work Facilitation, etc.) felt more at some levels than others? Which ones and why?

Felt most strongly at the E7 up to the 03 level. Looks as tho all planning is done at the department head level, but these goals + plans are not being shared with the middle managers; or they feel that they don't get a chance to participate.

4. Interpersonal indices (i.e. support, teamwork, etc.) felt more at some levels than others? Which ones and why?

Lack of support is expressed at all levels from 01-02 down to E1-E3. Teamwork is the issue for E6 + E1-E3. Lack of support could be the result of lack of plans + goals + lack of communication. In both cases where teamwork appears, so does support, indicating that teamwork is dependent upon support.

The activities involved in this section have been aimed at giving you an

overview of the total Command climate and how certain factors are transmitted

from level to another. The idea is to work from the more general

Exhibit 18

ADDITIONAL SURVEY PRINTOUTS

The additional survey printouts are held by:

CDR R. A. McGonigal, Code 55Mb
Department of Operations Research and
Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

SEMINARS/WORKSHOPS

1. Workshops


- a. Communications (2-4 hours)
- b. Motivation (2-4 hours)
- c. Decision Making (2-3 hours)
- d. Power and Authority (2-4 hours)
- e. Goals and Plans (6 hours - 2 days)
- f. Values (1-2 hours)
- g. Leadership Styles (1-2 hours)
- h. Peer group/Intergroup (4 hours)
- i. Mirroring Exercise (6 hours - 2 days)
- j. Team Building (1-4 hours)
- k. Effective Meetings (30 minutes)

2. CAPS (1-3 days)

3. Consultation

- a. Career Counseling
- b. Drugs
- c. Alcohol
- d. Overseas Diplomacy

Exhibit 20



HRMC's CONFERENCE ROOM ARRANGEMENT

PEER GROUP "WE WANTS"

GROUP I (Officers/Master and Senior Chiefs/CPO's/PO1's

1. Delineation of divisional responsibility.
- *2. Eliminate crisis management via integrated department planning based on human resources and time available.
- *3. Strengthen and properly use chain of command (lip service) (respect a two way street).
4. Tailor I Division indoctrination to fit needs of individual.
5. Dissemination of information (POD, PDL).
6. Enforcement of taps.
- *7. Leave and Liberty policy.

GROUP II (PO2)

1. Laundry service.
- *2. More definite PQS program (school call after dinner-OJT)
- *3. Better watch bill coordination.
- *4. Recognize and consult PO2.

GROUP III (PO3)

- *1. Proper deadline for chits.
- *2. Duty Corpsman from another ship.
- *3. Policy of sending messcooks.
- *4. Administration not properly manned.
5. Change to a six section watch.
6. Tropical hours over standard working hours.
7. Better recreation facilities aboard.
8. Shave inspection after knock-off.
9. Variation in crew's menu.
10. Civilian clothes on messdecks anytime.

GROUP IV (E-2/E-3)

1. Restructure working parties and include restricted men.
 2. Make the AAP known to the crew.
 - *3. Show respect both up and down.
 4. No indepth feedback from stricker board.
 - *5. Improve information flow in chain of command.
 6. Opportunities for school during yard period.
 - *7. More OJT, GMT indoctrination and training by LPO's for newly reported personnel.
 8. Better introduction of newly reported personnel by I Division.
 9. Expedite special request chit - more feedback on chits.
- *indicates a top priority concern.

Exhibit 21

SIX STEP PLANNING ACTION TEAMS

TEAM "A"	TEAM "B"	TEAM "C"	TEAM "D"
SH1	BTCS	LTJG	LTJG
HT1	SD1	MMCM	MM1
OS2	OS2	GMG1	RM2
STG2	GMM2	FTM2	MM2
FTM2	STG3	SH3	CSC
FTM3	MM3	MM2	OS3
BT3	SN	ICFN	ETNSN
HTFN	RMSA	SA	SA
SMSN			

FACILITATORS

TEAM "A"	CPO TEVIS
"B"	CWO HARRIS/BT1 GRAHAM
"C"	MCPO JUNTUN
"D"	SCPO JACOBY
	HRMC ZULU TEAM LEADER
	CDR A. C. REAGAN

We need to improve assignment of working party and mess cook procedures.

BRIEF OF ACTION STEP	HOW TO KNOW IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETION DATE	PERSON RESPONSIBLE	PERSON ACCOUNTABLE
1. Form committee to develop form.	When committee formed.	8/8/7X	WEPS	XO
2. Develop standard form for working party.	When rough form completed.	8/10/7X	SR. Member	WEPS
3. Submit rough form for approval.	When form submitted to CO.	8/11/7X	SR. Member	WEPS
4. Make forms available to working party supervisors.	When available.	8/16/7X	WEPS	XO

Exhibit 23

We need to improve watch bill coordination.

BRIEF OF ACTION STEP	HOW TO KNOW IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETION DATE	PERSON RESPONSIBLE	PERSON ACCOUNTABLE
1. Clear with CO.	CO's approval.	ASAP	SWO	Team Delta
2. Re-examine and specify available watch standers (designate exempt pers.).	Thunderbolt notice	8/30/7X	SWO	Dept. Heads
3. Re-examine required watch stations (re-group watches).	Change to Sorm.	9/20/7X	SWO with XO	Dept. Heads
4. Define watch coordination qualifications.	Thunderbolt Inst.	9/20/7X	SWO & XO	Team Delta
5. Establish guidelines for watch coordinator meetings (i.e., standby, leave).	Thunderbolt Inst.	9/20/7X	XO	SWO and Dept. Heads
6. Assign sectional Dept. watch coordinators and senior coordinator of group.	Memo to SWO from Dept. Heads.	10/20/7X	Dept. Hd.	Div. Officers
7. Schedule watch coordination meetings	Memo from SWO POD	11/20/7X	SWO	Watch Coord.

We need to improve indoctrination of newly reported men.

BRIEF OF ACTION STEP	HOW TO KNOW IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETION DATE	PERSON RESPONSIBLE	PERSON ACCOUNTABLE
1. CO approve mandatory attendance policy.	CO's signature	20 July 7X	XO	XO
2. Implementation of "I" Division into Sorm.	When it becomes a shipboard instruction.	1 Aug 7X	XO	Admin. Officer
3. Establish "I" Division evaluation board.	By appointment.	1 Aug 7X	XO	XO
4. Establish curriculum.	Approved by board.	15 Sept 7X	Training Officer	Evaluation Board
5. Seek volunteers for instructors.	In POD.	24 Sept 7X	Evaluation Board	Training Officer
6. Request quotas for IT school.	When letter off ship.	6 Aug 7X	XO	Admin. Officer
7. Seek periodic inputs from division to Evaluation Board.	After first input.	Nov 7X	Evaluation Board	Division Officer

We need to improve special request chit procedures.

BRIEF OF ACTION STEP	HOW TO KNOW IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETION DATE	PERSON RESPONSIBLE	PERSON ACCOUNTABLE
1. CO approval.	Verbal	17 Jul 7X	CO	CO
2. Form a committee consisting of a cross section of command.	Thunderbolt Inst.	13 Aug 7X	XO	CO
3. Provide committee with HRAV input.	Committee provided	13 Aug 7X	XO	CO
4. Review/Revise chit procedures including review of instruction from higher authority.	Report from committee to CO.	17 Aug 7X	Committee Chairman	XO
5. Write a new instruction.	Instruction.	31 Aug 7X	Committee Chairman	XO
6. Route to Department heads.	Dept. Hd. signature	7 Sept 7X	Committee Chairman	XO
7. Review dept. Hd. inputs.	Final rough draft.	10 Sept 7X	Committee Chairman	XO
8. Submit to XO/CO for approval.	Signature.	13 Sept 7X	Committee Chairman	

We need to improve special request chit procedures. (Continued)

BRIEF OF ACTION STEP	HOW TO KNOW IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETION DATE	PERSON RESPONSIBLE	PERSON ACCOUNTABLE
9. Promulgate instruction.	When distributed.	20 Sept 7X	XO	CO
10. Ensure dissemination via school call.	Memo from Div. Off.	27 Sept 7X	Div. Off.	Training Off.
11. Include in "I" Division lesson plans.	Memo from "I" Div. Off.	27 Sept 7X	"I" Div. Off.	XO
12. Periodic excerpts Visual. in POD.	Visual.	Daily/quarterly excerpts	Training Off.	XO
13. Establish enforcement.	Feedback		crew	CO

We need to improve information flow of line management.

BRIEF OF ACTION STEP	HOW TO KNOW IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETION DATE	PERSON RESPONSIBLE	PERSON ACCOUNTABLE
1. CO approval.	Memo to XO	16 Aug 7X	CO	CO
2. Establish ship-board coordinator.	CO memo appointing Sr. Enlisted advisor.	17 Aug 7X	CO	CO
3. Locate facilitators for seminars.	POD note.	As defined and needed	Sr. enlisted advisor	CO
4. Establish content and frequency guidelines for seminars. a. CO, XO/Dept Hd/LPO seminars. b. Dept/Middle and line managers seminar. c. LPO sub seminar. d. LPO meetings to discuss common problems.	Thunderbolt notice or instruction.	30 Nov 7X	Dept Hds/ XO/SEA Div Off CPO SEA CPO/LPO/ SEA SR LPO/ SEA	CO Dept Hds Div Off XO

Exhibit 24

We need to improve awareness of respect.

BRIEF OF ACTION STEP	HOW TO KNOW IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETION DATE	PERSON RESPONSIBLE	PERSON ACCOUNTABLE
1. CO approval	CO's signature	7/20/7X	Team Leader	Sr. enlisted advisor
2. Incorporate human relations into "I" division curriculum.	When approved by "I" division evaluation board.	9/15/7X	Team Leader	"I" Div eval board
3. Establish effective media (i.e., posters).	When posted.	7/16/7X	Human Resource council	RAFT
4. Get quotas for leadership school.	When Ltr. off ship.	8/6/7X	XO	XO
5. Awareness seminar for middle/line/and below.	When first one is held.	continuing	Human Resource council	RAFT

We need to improve information flow of middle management.

BRIEF OF ACTION STEP	HOW TO KNOW IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETION DATE	PERSON RESPONSIBLE	PERSON ACCOUNTABLE
1. Obtain CO approval.	Verbal.	1 July	CO	CO
2. Schedule seminars A. Seminar agenda 1. revise existing routing system. 2. relocate boxes to be readily accessible. 3. emphasize frequent check of boxes. 4. ensure adequate assignment of boxes. 5. designate dept. yeoman. B. Reduction of internal paperwork	Upon adjournment.	13 Aug	Team Leader	XO
3. Disseminate planning board for training results to middle management for appropriate action.	Copies of planning board for training results distribution.	20 Jul	Dept Head	XO


We need to improve consistency of liberty procedures.

BRIEF OF ACTION STEP	HOW TO KNOW IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETION DATE	PERSON RESPONSIBLE	PERSON ACCOUNTABLE
1. Submit plan to CO with following items for approval.	When approved.	ASAP	Team	CO
2. Form a committee.	When formed.	7/20/7X	XO	CO
3. Committee to review and revise current inst. to include following a. delegate authority to line management to grant liberty. b. make middle management responsible for making workload schedules and changes available to line management. c. establish procedures for middle management to promulgate the work load. d. develop plan to inform line management of immediate changes in workload.	When plan submitted to CO for approval.	8/6/7X	Senior member	XO

We need to improve consistency of liberty procedures. (Continued)

BRIEF OF ACTION STEP	HOW TO KNOW IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED	COMPLETION DATE	PERSON RESPONSIBLE	PERSON ACCOUNTABLE
4. Promulgate new instruction to crew.	When instruction in effect.	8/13/7X	X	CO

APPENDIX C



BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Argyris, C., Intervention Theory and Method: A Behavioral Science View, Addison-Wesley, 1973.
2. Argyris, C., Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness, Irwin-Dorsey, 1962.
3. Barnes, L., "Approaches to Organizational Change," in Bennis, W. G. and others, The Planning of Change, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 79-84, 1969.
4. Baumgartel, H., "Using Employee Questionnaire Results for Improving Organizations," Kansas Business Review, 12 p. 1-6, December 1959.
5. Beckhard, R., Organization Development: Strategies and Models, Addison-Wesley, 1969.
6. Beer, M. and Huse, E. F., "A Systems Approach to Organization Development," The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, v. 8, No. 1, p. 79-101, 1972.
7. Bennis, W. G., Organization Development: Its Nature, Origins and Prospects, Addison-Wesley, 1969.
8. Blake, R. R. and Mouton, J. S., Building a Dynamic Corporation through Grid Organization Development, Addison-Wesley, 1969.
9. Bowers, D. G., "OD Techniques and their Results in 23 Organizations: The Michigan ICL Study," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, v. 9, No. 1, p. 21-43, 1973.
10. Bowers, D. G., and Franklin, J. F., "Survey-Guided Development: Using Human Resources Measurement in Organizational Change," Journal of Contemporary Business, v. 1 (3), p. 43-55, 1972.
11. Burke, W. W., and Hornstein, H. A., The Social Technology of Organization Development, NTL Learning Resources Corp., 1972.
12. Derr, C. B., "Successful Entry as a Key to Successful Organization Development in Big City School Systems," in Burke, W. W. and Hornstein, H. A., The Social Technology of Organization Development, NTL Learning Resources Corp., p. 41-52, 1972.


13. Derr, C. B. and Demb, A., "Building Collaborative Relationships: A Study of University-Urban School System Interactions," a research report for the University Council for Educational Administration and the Leadership Training Institute, Summer 1973. (unpublished)
14. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Instruction 5300.6A, 13 December 1973.
15. French, W. L., and Bell, C. H., Organization Development, Prentice-Hall, 1973.
16. Greiner, L. F., "Patterns of Organization Change," Harvard Business Review, 45, p. 119-130, May-June 1967.
17. Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Technical Report, Perspectives in Organizational Development, by D. G. Bowers, September 1970.
18. Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Technical Report, Development Techniques and Organizational Change: An Overview of Results from the Michigan Inter-Company Longitudinal Study, by D. G. Bowers, September 1971.
19. Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Technical Report, The Practice of Organizational Development: A Selective Review, by M. A. Frohman and M. Sashkin, October, 1970.
20. Lawrence, P. R., "How to Deal with Resistance to Change," Harvard Business Review, v. 47, No. 1, p. 4-12, 166-176, 1969.
21. Lawrence, P. R. and Lorsch, J. W., Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action, Addison-Wesley, 1969.
22. Lorsch, J. W. and Lawrence, P., "The Diagnosis of Organizational Problems," in W. G. Bennis and others, The Planning of Change, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 468-478, 1969.
23. Mann, F. C., "Studying and Creating Change," in W. G. Bennis and others The Planning of Change, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 605-613, 1961.
24. Miles, M. B. and others, "The Consequence of Survey Feedback: Theory Evaluation," in W. G. Bennis and others The Planning of Change, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 457-468, 1969.

25. Neff, F., "Survey Research: A Tool for Problem Diagnosis and Improvement in Organizations," in S. Miller and A. Gouldner, Applied Sociology, Free Press, p. 23-38, 1965.
26. Phillips, B. S., Social Research: Strategy and Tactics, McMillan, 1971.
27. Schein, E. H., Process Consultation: Its Role in Organization Development, Addison-Wesley, 1969.
28. Scott, W., "Organization Theory: An Overview and Appraisal," American Management Journal, v. 4, No. 1, p. 7-26, April 1961.
29. Survey-Guided Development: A Consultant Manual for Human Resource Management Specialists, NAVPERS 15264, November, 1974.
30. Towl, A. R., To Study Administration by Cases, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1969.
31. Weisbord, N., "The Organization Development Contract," OD Practitioner, v. 5, No. 2, Summer 1973.
32. U. S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U. S. Navy, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No Copies
1. Defense Documentation Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314	2
2. Library, Code 0212 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
3. Commanding Officer Human Resource Management Center, Norfolk 5621-23 Tidewater Drive Norfolk, Virginia 23509	1
4. Commanding Officer Human Resource Management Center FPO San Francisco, 96610	1
5. Commanding Officer Human Resource Management Center, San Diego Naval Training Center San Diego, California 92133	1
6. Captain Wilson Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840	1
7. Chief of Naval Education and Training (N33) Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida 32508	1
8. Chief of Naval Education and Training(N332) Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida 32508	1
9. Chief of Naval Personnel (Pers 6) Navy Department Washington, D. C. 20370	1
10. Chief of Naval Personnel (Pers 62) Navy Department Washington, D. C. 20370	1
11. Commanding Officer Human Resources Management School Naval Air Station Memphis (96) Millington, Tennessee 38054	1

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| 12. | Chief of Naval Personnel (Pers 622)
Navy Department
Washington, D. C. 20370 | 1 |
| 13. | Chief of Naval Personnel (Pers 6211)
Navy Department
Washington, D. C. 20370 | 1 |
| 14. | Commanding Officer
Human Resources Management Detachment,
Alameda
Naval Air Station Alameda
Alameda, California 94501 | 1 |
| 15. | CDR Richard A. McGonigal, Code 55 Mb
Department of Operations Research and
Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940 | 2 |
| 16. | Assoc. Professor F. M. Teti, Code 56 Tr
Department of Government
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940 | 1 |
| 17. | LCDR Thomas J. Colavito, USN
USS Pharris (DE 1094)
FPO New York 09501 | 3 |
| 18. | Department Chairman, Code 55
Department of Operations Research
and Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940 | 1 |



159400

Thesis
C53154
c.1

Colavito

An analysis of OD
Technology in the U. S.
Navy: a case study.

159400

Thesis
C53154
c.1

Colavito

An analysis of OD
Technology in the U. S.
Navy: a case study.

thesC53154

An analysis of OD Technology in the U.S.



3 2768 002 08331 3

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY